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Common law courts have for centuries regarded corporations as artifi-
cial persons-colorless, invisible, intangible persons. Yet, recently some
courts have ruled that corporations can and do possess racial identities "as a
matter of law." This Article explores the practical and theoretical implica-
tions of this ruling, both for our understanding of corporate personality and
of race. In doing so, the Article develops an economic model of race based on
representations and interpretations of racial signals and commitments. This
model is used to suggest an approach to antidiscrimination law that avoids
racial essentialism and an approach to corporate law that complicates share-
holder primacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Perfectly ordinary events sometimes come together to produce ex-
traordinary legal questions. This was one of those occasions. It began
when Major Joseph B. Johnson, a former slave, acquired land encum-
bered with covenants restricting transfer to "colored persons."1 Such cov-
enants were common at the time, almost a half century before the U.S.
Supreme Court would rule their enforcement unconstitutional. 2 But be-
cause the property was purchased in the name of Johnson's corpora-
tion-"a corporation composed exclusively of negroes," chartered to "de-
velop a pleasure park for the amusement of colored people"3-a court
was asked to determine whether the corporation itself was a "colored per-
son." In People's Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, the court concluded that the
corporation was a person only in law, and "in law, there can be no such
thing as a colored corporation."4 And so Johnson was allowed to retain
the property.
This conclusion outraged locals and deeply troubled the era's lead-
ing corporate law scholars. 5 Yet there was absolutely nothing exceptional
in the application of law. Common law courts had for centuries regarded
corporations as artificial persons-colorless, invisible, intangible per-
1. Johnson was "[b]orn and raised a slave in Richmond [and was] in his late teens
when the city fell to Union troops in 1865." PeterJ. Rachleff, Black Labor in the South 87
(1984). He would later command the Virginia Sixth Negro Regiment during the Spanish-
American War, earning the rank of Major. Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., Virginia's Negro
Regiment in the Spanish-American War, 80 Va. Mag. Hist. & Biography 193, 194 (1972).
2. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1953) (holding that state court
damage awards for violation of racially restrictive covenants were prohibited by Fourteenth
Amendment); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1948) (holding that enforcements of
racially restrictive covenants violate Fourteenth Amendment).
3. People's Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 61 S.E. 794, 795-96 (Va. 1908); see also
People's Pleasure Park Company Charter (certified Mar. 20, 1906) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
4. Petition for Rehearing at 4, People's Pleasure Park, 61 S.E. 794 (No. 135); see also
People's Pleasure Park, 61 S.E. at 796-97 (ruling for People's Pleasure Park).
5. See, e.g., I. Maurice Wormser, Disregard of the Corporate Fiction and Allied
Corporate Problems 27 (1927) [hereinafter Wormser, Disregard] ("The decision entirely
overlooks that the sole purpose of organization of the corporation was obviously to evade
and circumvent the title restriction."); see also discussion infra Part III.B.
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sons.6 The imagined personhood of corporations had not before been
extended to race, nor would it be for years to come.
Recently, however, courts have declared that corporations can and
do possess racial identities "as a matter of law."' 7 It is tempting to recon-
cile this turnabout with People's Pleasure Park by pointing to postmodern
conceptions of race and to the highly personified nature of modern
American corporations. These points are not without merit. The idea
that natural race distinctions are no longer thought to exist, while at the
same time private corporations thrive, would likely have shocked eight-
eenth-century American lawyers. 8 Legal understandings of race and cor-
porate existence have certainly evolved over time, but they stand today
not so far from where they were when People's Pleasure Park was decided.
The critical difference between now and then lies not so much in variable
conceptions of racial identity and corporate personality, but rather in the
way, once conceived, courts regulate race and corporations.
The courts' current recognition of race in corporations may seem
odd, but it is no more striking than the Supreme Court of Virginia's re-
fusal (at the turn of the prior century) to treat the People's Pleasure Park
Company as if it was black. This court, after all, recognized and gave
6. On "colorless," see Hudson Valley Freedom Theater, Inc. v. Heimbach, 671 F.2d
702, 708 (2d Cir. 1982) (Pierce, J., concurring) (arguing that "colorless corporate
Iperson"' should have cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment for racial
discrimination claims); Arthur W. Machen,Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 253,
256 (1911) ("Some writers make the real corporate organism a mere colorless, lifeless
'subject of rights."'). On "invisible" and "intangible," see Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) ("A corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."); see also id. at 667 (Story,
J., concurring) (describing corporation as "an artificial person, existing in contemplation
of law, and endowed with certain powers and franchises .. .subsisting in the corporation
itself, as distinctly as if it were a real personage"). The corporate persona fiction has been
traced to Roman law by some scholars, but since Roman jurists did not use the expression
"persona ficta," there remains controversy over the attribution to Rome. There is greater
agreement, however, that Pope Innocent IV was the first to explicitly formulate the fiction
theory in the mid-thirteenth century. See Frederick Hallis, Corporate Personality: A Study
in Jurisprudence 6-7 n.3 (1930) (describing Innocent's role); John Dewey, The Historic
Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale LJ. 655, 665 (1926) (same); Martin
Wolff, On the Nature of Legal Persons, 54 Law Q. Rev. 494, 496 (1938) (same).
7. Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir.
2004) (finding that corporation can acquire "an imputed racial identity"); see also Bains
LLC v. Arco Prod. Co., 405 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that corporation
"undoubtedly acquired an imputed racial identity"); Pourier v. S.D. Dep't of Revenue,
2003 SD 21, 21, 6 N.W.2d 395, 404 (holding corporation was "enrolled member" of
Indian tribe), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 2004 SD 3, 674 N.W.2d 314,
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1064 (2005).
8. Thomas Jefferson, for instance, would probably be taken aback by these
circumstances, for he firmly believed in "the real distinction which nature has made"
among the races, and he "looked skeptically" on the budding corporate expansion, which
his longtime adversary John Marshall had bolstered from the Supreme Court. Joyce
Appleby, Thomas Jefferson 76, 85-86 (2003) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the
State of Virginia 141 (1800)).
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countenance to black blood, black churches, black cemeteries, black
books (even Bibles), and much more. 9 Southern courts at this time im-
bued race into things and persons with great facility. So, whatever the
reason that inspired the court to render the People's Pleasure Park Com-
pany raceless, it was certainly not an inability to perceive racial content in
nonhuman objects and constructs. 10 Nor is an appeal to corporate for-
malism satisfying. No, the court possessed a nuanced understanding of
the practical structure of race and of corporations, and it was that under-
standing that determined the outcome of the case. The decision was de-
termined by an unstated but prevalent concern for equality rights and
creditors' rights in the race-contingent world of Jim Crow, as well as the
court's ever pressing concern about managing race.
Looking at the courts' treatment of race in the corporate context
over time offers broad insight into the practice of attributing race to per-
sons, legal and natural. From this perspective, I advance the following
three arguments, while suggesting an economics approach to race and
social identity. First, there are no legal, and currently few practical, rea-
sons why corporate persons cannot be associated with racial identities.
Second, the state's participation in this practice should be restrained, but
cannot (nor ought to) be eliminated. Third, legal persons adopt and are
ascribed identities for the same reasons as natural persons: Identities sig-
nify commitments of persons to other persons, communities, beliefs, and
conventions. Indeed, in much the same way that Jacob Levy saw the im-
portance of commitment for culture, so too must the importance of com-
mitment for identity be recognized.' Once viewed as such, a straightfor-
ward economic approach to racial identity (as signals and manifestations
of commitments) can be demonstrated. These three points combined, if
made to work in a legal institution, suggest a legal understanding of race
more in line with current social scientific and humanist understandings.
The law should demand that race be recognized as something existing in
interactions and give it importance (in law) only to the extent that it is
connected to legally cognizable harm resulting from such interactions,
without appealing to elusive essentialist notions of race. 12
9. See infra text accompanying notes 94-100.
10. The claim that these courts were constrained by biological conceptions of race,
and therefore could not imagine a colored corporation, is unpersuasive. The Supreme
Court's knowledge of the state's role in constructing race was made quite clear in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896): "[T]he question of the proportion of colored blood
necessary to constitute a colored person, as distinguished from a white person, is one upon
which there is a difference of opinion in the different States .... [b]ut these are questions
to be determined under the laws of each State ...." Id. (emphasis added).
11. Jacob T. Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear 112 (2000) ("To have a culture whose
exit is entirely costless .. . is to have no culture at all.").
12. For example, Nancy Fraser argues that the failure to recognize or the act of
discouraging performances constitutes a harm. See Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus:
Critical Reflection on the "Postsocialist" Condition 11-39 (1997).
2026 [Vol. 106:2023
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Race is, as Erving Goffman long ago suggested, best thought of as a
symbolic interaction,' 3 recognizable through patterns of representation
and interpretation that render the race characteristic both visible and
veiled. Because race is deployable in this sense, we can wear or discard
our racial identities like masks. The corporation, as a corporate person, a
persona ficta, itself constitutes another mask that allows persons to con-
ceal and display their identities. 14 The economic and legal implications
of this practice are first considered in Part I of this Article, which lays the
groundwork for an economic understanding of race. The analysis is fur-
ther developed in Part II, which applies it to the practice of attributing
racial identities to corporations and natural persons. Part III examines
the prior political and economic constraints on corporate racial identity,
looking at People's Pleasure Park and a number of other cases and statutes,
such as the so-called Gold Laws of preapartheid South Africa and the Day
Law of Kentucky in the postbellum South. Part IV then turns to the fun-
damental issues of race management and further explains the prior
weight against racing corporations. Part V focuses on the current legal
regime that recognizes race within corporations, revealing some caution-
ary connections to the Nuremberg Laws of Nazi Germany, but also some
promising developments in the doctrine. Part VI situates this developing
legal doctrine within the modern political economic context. The Article
then briefly concludes.
I. IDENTITY, SOCIAL CATEGORIES, AND COMMITMENT
Take two individuals engaged in a transaction-imagine, for exam-
ple, that one seeks to purchase a home from the other. In the standard
economic model, the value that each party derives from the transaction is
entirely independent of the other party's identity. Indeed, a party's
value, in the standard model, is independent of her own identity.1 5 Like
the standard economic model, much legal doctrine obscures the salience
of identity qua identity,1 6 though when confronted directly with the issue,
13. Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 252-54 (rev. ed.,
Anchor Books 1959) (1956).
14. "Persona" literally means "mask" in Latin. 11 Oxford English Dictionary 597-98
(2d ed. 1986).
15. Economics Nobel Laureate George Akerlof and collaborator Rachel Kranton
responded to this latter deficiency by advancing a theoretical model that responds to how
"identity, a person's sense of self, affects economic outcomes." George A. Akerlof & Rachel
E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. Econ. 715, 715 (2000).
16. Identity is often unseen in legal doctrine, aside from a particular individual's
ability to satisfy a legal obligation. For instance, the doctrines of impossibility and
impracticability recognize that the death or disabling illness of a promisor (e.g., a
particular artist) or of a promisee (e.g., a particular subject) may excuse the legal
obligation of a party or an estate. See James P. Nehf, 14 Corbin on Contracts §§ 75.1-75.2
Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed., Matthew Bender 2001). Outside of such contexts, identity
recedes to the shadows of a dominant view of discrete arms-length transacting between
parties who are assumed to be indifferent to the identity of the other. "The essence of
personal relations in the discrete transaction is what sociologists call nonprimary
2006] 2027
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law does give substance to the importance of identity.17 Courts are, for
example, likely to weigh identity in transactions that are premised on "el-
ements of personal trust"'18 or that subsequently become "'impregnated'
[with] 'personal and confidential"' qualities. 19 Furthermore, the law
gives weight to identity through various doctrinal conventions in the law
of trade secrets, 20 business organizations, 21 trusts, 2 2 contracts, 23 patents,
relations[,] i.e., it does not matter who the other party to the transaction is." Ian R.
Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a
"Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1018, 1034 (1981).
17. See Winchester v. Howard, 97 Mass. 303, 305 (1867) ("[E]very man has a right to
elect what parties he will deal with .... 'You have a right to the benefit you contemplate
from the character, credit and substance of the person with whom you contract."' (quoting
Humble v. Hunter, (1848) 12 Q.B. 310, 317)); Note, Personal Prejudice and the Doctrine
of the Undisclosed Principal, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1271 passim (1931) (arguing that party's
right to choose her counterparty is embedded in contract law and that personal animosity
should be credible basis on which to rest nullification of contracts). On the other hand,
one commentator has observed that "[t]he right to an attitude which may be the result of
personal idiosyncracy [sic] or emotional reaction is not a legally or equitably protected
right." Note, Non-Disclosure of Principal as a Defense to Specific Performance, 75 U. Pa.
L. Rev. & Am. L. Reg. 761, 769-70 (1927) [hereinafter Non-Disclosure].
18. Non-Disclosure, supra note 17, at 762-63.
19. Town & Country House & Home Serv., Inc. v. Newbery, 147 N.E.2d 724, 725 (N.Y.
1958) (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
20. Courts use the route-nonroute distinction-which highlights the importance of
individual identity in the performance of services-as a factor in determining whether
customer lists and the like are to be treated as trade secrets. "A nonroute customer is one
whose demand varies, and who is likely to purchase from several suppliers. Courts have
been less prone to give relief in this area because there is no particular relationship
developed between a customer and a salesman which is enduring." Abbott Labs. v. Norse
Chem. Corp., 147 N.W.2d 529, 540 (Wis. 1967) see also Corroon & Black-Rutters &
Roberts, Inc. v. Hosch, 325 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Wis. 1982) (citing Abbott and discussing
route-nonroute distinction as applied to insurance agents), superseded by statute, Act of
Apr. 15, 1986, ch. 236, § 6, 1985 Wis. Legis. Serv. 1198, 1199-1201 (West), as recognized in
Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W.2d 773, 777 (Wis. 1989).
21. The corporate opportunity doctrine (and the related partnership doctrine)
recognizes the possibility-though with some general hostility-that a third party's refusal
to deal with the firm or an individual may serve as a defense to an appropriation of a
business opportunity. See Monin v. Monin, 785 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) ("We
conclude the trial court's reasoning is flawed in that it ignores Sonny's duties to the
partnership."); Energy Res. Corp. v. Porter, 438 N.E.2d 391, 394-95 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982)
(acknowledging that corporate inability to exploit opportunity provides defense while
rejecting application of defense based upon lack of sufficient evidence).
22. The standard trust law presumption that a trust does not fail for lack of a trustee
allows the court to appoint trustees without regard to the trustee's specific identity or
personality. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 34 (2003). However, when the identity of the
trustee is regarded as essential to the purpose of the trust, then the trust will fail for want of
a trustee. See 2 Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts
§ 101.1 (4th ed. 1987).
23. Contract law allows, for instance, avoidance of obligations in cases when identity is
a basic assumption of the agreement. See Gwin v. Tusa, 111 So. 339, 339 (La. 1927);
Adams v. Gillig, 92 N.E. 670, 672-73 (N.Y. 1910); Williams v. Kerr, 25 A. 618, 619 (Pa.
1893); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 cmt. g (1981).
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and bankruptcy. 24
Cases involving the law of agency perhaps offer the clearest state-
ments on the legal significance of identity.2 5 In the typical case, an agent,
acting on behalf of her principal, enters into an agreement with a third
party. At the time of formation the third party is taken to be unaware
either of the principal's existence or of the principal's identity.
Postformation, once the principal has been identified, the third party
"objects to the race, religion, personality, political affiliations, genealogy,
sex, or character, of the principal,"26 and sues to rescind an otherwise
enforceable agreement. When resolving these disputes, courts often
draw a distinction between a third party's personally motivated refusal to
deal with an identified principal and an economically motivated desire to
deal differently with that principal. 27 Economic and opportunistic chal-
lenges to enforcement-including claims that one would have demanded
different or better terms from a subsequently identified principal-are
normally given short shrift.28 However, refusals to deal based on a per-
24. The federal patent law providing that nonexclusive licenses are personal and
nondelegable-and hence nonassignable without the licensor's consent-exists to address
concerns that licensors have over the identity of their licensees; that is, concerns over not
just the identity of the individual licensees (such as a corporate personality), but also the
identity of the owners and agents of the corporate and other business licensees. This
identity-contingent legal practice raises an interesting issue when firms go into bankruptcy,
because bankruptcy reorganization typically changes the ownership of the firm (effectively
allowing the creditors to take over). While § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365
(2000), generally gives the bankruptcy trustee authority to assign contracts (including
licenses), § 365(c) purports to enforce the federal patent restraint. There is currently a
circuit split over whether the identity of the new residual owners of a corporate personality
in bankruptcy represents a distinct identity. See In re Catapult Entm't, Inc., 165 F.3d 747,
750, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that debtor in possession cannot assume executory
contract where "identity of the nondebtor party is material"); Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge
Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding that court "cannot simply
presume as a matter of law that the debtor-in-possession is a legal entity materially distinct
from the prepetition debtor").
25. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 304 (1958), which is reiterated in the
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.11(4) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003).
26. See Non-Disclosure, supra note 17, at 767.
27. See, for example, Cole v. Hunter Tract Improvement Co., 112 P. 368, 368-69
(Wash. 1910), where a black purchaser obtained title to a lot from a developer who was
unwilling to sell to blacks.
28. For example, the seller in Cole appears to have attempted to convince the court
that it was his economic wellbeing, not racial prejudice, that was at issue here; the seller
"introduced evidence tending to show, that if sales of lots in this addition were made to
people of that race it would depreciate the value of the [rest of the development]." Id. at
368. The court supported the black purchaser, declaring that the race of the purchaser,
though clearly relevant to the seller, "[was] not of the essence of the contract" and "[did]
not come as near being related to the rights of the parties under the contract as a mistake
in the value of the thing sold would." Id. at 369. Several more recent holdings support the
proposition that a third party will not be permitted to void a contract with an undisclosed
principal merely by asserting that he would have demanded a higher price or better terms
had he known of the specific principal's existence. See Finlay v. Dalton, 164 S.E.2d 763,
766 (S.C. 1968); Warr v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 115 S.E.2d 799, 804 (S.C. 1960).
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sonal aversion to other parties are often afforded legal deference. 29 In
nodding to this consideration, courts simultaneously recognize the signif-
icance of individuals' identities and the social categories of others with
whom they transact.
A. Signifying Effects of Corporate Racial Attribution
Seizing the connection between identity and social categories helps
us to clarify the nature of raced corporations. While it is true that racial
identity-as a matter of law and otherwise-can be attributed to corpo-
rate personalities, it would be a serious mistake to reify race or per-
sonhood in the corporate context. The attribution of race to a corporate
entity is best understood as an act, or better yet a performance, which
signifies the identity of the attributor and commits, or seeks to commit,
the attributor or the corporation (or both) to certain ideas, associations,
persons, or practices. This performance may be undertaken by corporate
agents promoting the entity or by third parties undermining it. For ex-
ample, in Bains LLC v. Arco Products Co., the plaintiff-firm, a trucking com-
pany owned by three East Indian Sikh brothers, "alleged that it had been
subject to racial discrimination. °3 0 The court agreed, finding based on
Even in cases where economic considerations related to identity do not appear
opportunistic, courts have shown reluctance to void agreements. For example, in Kelly
Asphalt Block Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 105 N.E. 88, 90 (N.Y. 1914), Judge
Cardozo enforced an agreement between a firm and an undisclosed principal, which
happened to be a business competitor that suspected the firm would not have dealt with it
knowing its identity. See also Miller v. Fulmer, 25 Pa. Super. 106, 111 (Super. Ct. 1904)
(finding declaration by purchaser that he intends to use for one purpose but secretly
intends another is not in itself sufficient for fraudulent misrepresentation).
29. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.11(4) (Tentative Draft 2000); Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 304; see also Non-Disclosure, supra note 17, at 763-69. Indeed,
legal recognition of personal animosity as a bar to enforcement was implicit in the passage
of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which sought to provide blacks with the same legal capacity "to
make and enforce contracts [as] white citizens." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2000)
(originally enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § I, 14 Stat. 27, 27). Racial animosity
among private actors served as a potential bar to contract enforcement until the late 1960s,
when § 1981 and § 1982 were applied to private action in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 419-22 (1968). For a discussion of this case, see George Rutherglen, The
Improbable History of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused and Confused, 2003 Sup. Ct. Rev.
303, 330-37. Other forms of personal distaste-more idiosyncratic and noncategorical-
are also recognized as salient by courts. One example is Kaufman v. Sydeman, 146 N.E.
365 (Mass. 1925), where the third party's aversion to the principal was based on past
personal animosity involving termination of a business relationship between the principal
and a relative of the third party. The court refused to enforce the contract, for the sale of
cloth, against the third party, asserting that, at least as far a court of equity was concerned,
"one cannot be held to have contracted with a person whom he has refused to accept as
party to the contract." Id. at 367. Also at issue in such cases is whether the agent or the
principal knew or had reason to know that the third party would not have dealt with the
principal, evoking concerns of nondisclosure, misrepresentation, fraud, or the vague
doctrine of unclean hands.
30. 220 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (emphasis added), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 405 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2005). The firm alleged that it was discriminated
2030 [Vol. 106:2023
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the racist conduct of third parties toward the company,3' that it had "un-
doubtedly acquired an imputed racial identity. '32 The same court in
Thinket Ink Information Resources, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., looked
mainly to the actions and performances of shareholders and managers of
the plaintiff-corporation to conclude that it too had acquired a racial
identity.3 3 In Bains, the third party acts of racial attribution signified the
identities of those individuals, while at the same time committing (in
their eyes and the eyes of others) the plaintiff-firm to a mumbled set of
beliefs about East Indians. In Thinket, it was the corporate owners and
agents who committed the entity to certain practices, while also commu-
nicating their own identities and commitments.
B. Signaling Identity and Commitments
George Herbert Mead was among the first to claim explicitly that
language and communication are "essential for the development of the
self." 3 4 There is now considerable consensus about this view, although
there is no single agreed-upon communicative channel through which
identity is understood to be developed and expressed. Stephen
Greenblatt, for example, draws on Ben Johnson's comedy Volpone to ad-
against "while performing under the contract and that the contract had been terminated
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981." Id. "Plaintiff's owners and employees were consistently
referred to by derogatory racial epithets, were made to use slower pumps than other
drivers, made to wait longer to fill their trucks, subjected to higher security measures, and
generally treated differently than non-Indian drivers. . . . Eventually, without notice,
Defendant terminated Plaintiffs contract." Id.
31. The unseemly conduct of Arco's agents-including interfering with the truck
drivers' efforts to perform their jobs and referring to them with derogatory slang names
such as "'rag-heads,' 'f indians,' and 'towel-heads'"-was "pervasive and
continuous" and "impacted on the profitability of the company.... Moreover, immediately
after the termination of the contract, [one Arco employee] crowed that he had been
responsible in part for 'kick[ing] those rag heads out' of the facility." Id. at 1199.
32. Bains, 405 F.3d at 770. The court noted that "while not all of [the company's]
drivers were Sikhs, even the non-Sikh drivers testified that they were treated poorly by
Davis [Arco's agent] based on their association with what Davis saw as a Sikh company." Id.
For example, "Davis asked both Patrick Dauer and A.C. Morgan, the only two Caucasian
Flying B drivers, 'How did you get hooked up with these f- s?"' Id. at 767.
33. 368 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2004). In concluding that the corporation had a
racial identity, the court in Thinket relied significantly on the fact that it was wholly owned
by African Americans and that its managers sought and received government certification
to characterize the entity as a federally recognized minority-owned business. Id. See infra
notes 238-258 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the Court's practices in
these and related cases.
34. George H. Mead, Mind, Self, & Society: From the Standpoint of a Social
Behaviorist 135 (13th prtg. 1965). Mead actually used the phrase "the language process,"
by which he clearly meant communication: "The importance of what we term
'communication' lies in the fact that it provides a form of behavior in which the organism
or the individual may become an object to himself." Id. at 138. "[H]e becomes an object to
himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social
environment or context of experience and behavior in which both he and they are
involved." Id.
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vance a performative understanding of identity: "Volpone transforms
himself into a theater in which he is both actor and audience .... He
hears what he sounds like [and] sees what he looks like to others .... For
ourselves . . . this kind of self-consciousness is . .. our peculiar way of
regarding and manipulating our identities. 13 5 Kwame Anthony Appiah,
on the other hand, looks to the narrative structure in identity, observing
that the available labels which characterize social categories such as "wo-
man," "man," "black," "white," "gay," "straight," etc., "operate to mold
what we may call identification;"36 identification with the social category
defined by L implies "thinking of yourself as an L shapes your feel-
ings[,] ... your actions... [and] carries ethical and moral weight."3 7 But
if performances and narratives are how identities are communicated and
thereby realized, then commitments, I will suggest, are what identity per-
formances and narratives communicate. Social identities communicate a
person's commitments to groups, communities, institutions, conventions,
beliefs, and ideals. Without commitments, performances and narrative
35. Stephen J. Greenblatt, The False Ending in Volpone, 75 J. Eng. & Germanic
Philology 90, 94-95 (1976). "Volpone is consummately a man who has created his own
identity [through literal performances] . . . . [H]e is liberated even from himself,
uncommitted to a single, fixed role." Id. at 95. A still stronger notion of performative
identity has been offered by Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion
of Identity 163-80 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter Butler, Trouble]. See also Erving Goffman,
Frame Analysis 124 (1974) (discussing effect of performance on identity); Ian F. Haney
Lopez, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race 111-53 (1996) [hereinafter Haney
Lopez, White by Law] (discussing law's role in defining race); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating
Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 Yale L.J.
109, 156-58 (1998) (arguing that performing one's race proved central in mid-nineteenth
century Southern racial determination trials); John Tehranian, Note, Performing
Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in America,
109 Yale L.J. 817, 820 (2000) (arguing that performing one's race proved central to racial
determination in immigration litigation).
36. Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity 66 (2005) [hereinafter Appiah,
Identity].
37. Id. at 68. Glenn Loury and Hanming Fang develop an economic model of
personal and collective (not social) identity based on individual narratives: The way
persons "elect to represent themselves to one another affects the productivity of their
subsequent economic interactions." Glenn C. Loury & Hanming Fang, "Dysfunctional
Identities" Can Be Rational, 95 Am. Econ. Rev. 104, 104 (2005). "We think of an agent's
identity as the mechanism she uses to convert personal history into a more simplified
account of herself. A group's 'collective identity' is any self-representational mode of this
sort which has been adopted in common by (most of) the agents in that group." Id. Seyla
Benhabib similarly suggests that the self is defined and created by a narrative unity: "As
Hannah Arendt has emphasized, from the time of our birth we are immersed in a 'web of
narratives,' of which we are both the author and the object." Seyla Benhabib, Situating the
Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics 198 (1992). For
Benhabib, there is a narrative structure to our actions and identity, though she would likely
reject the individual choice presumption in Loury and Fang's formulation: "When the
story of a life can only be told from the perspective of others, then the self is a victim and
sufferer . . . . When the story of a life can only be told from the standpoint of the
individual, then the self is a narcissist and a loner . . . ." Id.
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are no more interpretable as identity than an actor's reading of lines on a
stage.
I approach racial performances and narratives as communicative
means of signifying identity and committing persons. Rejecting the stan-
dard economic approach, I assume in this Article that parties transact
from a self- and other-regarding perspective, which is to say that identity
matters. Identities matter not because individuals have "tastes" for cer-
tain identities and not for others, 38 but because identities commit and
reflect commitments; and commitments affect economic outcomes.
Identities, of course, are not perfectly observable to others, so indi-
viduals may have incentives to signal or conceal-through identity per-
formances-their identities. 39 But an individual's capacity to undertake
certain identity performances cannot be taken for granted, rather it var-
ies depending on her attributes and internal prescriptions. In economic
terms, this means that identity performances are differentially costly for
individuals to undertake. 40 These costs may be such that performances
38. Cf. Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination 14 (2d ed. 1971) (advancing
the taste-for-discrimination approach). Roland Fryer and Matthew Jackson offer an
alternative model showing that identities may matter, even without tastes for one social
identity or another, simply because of the cognitive demands of sorting identities-
particularly those less frequently encountered. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Matthew 0. Jackson,
A Psychological Model of Categories and Identification in Decision Making (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9579, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w9579 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Akerlof & Kranton, supra
note 15, at 716-17 (offering prescription-driven model of identity). I have no quarrel here
with these understandings of the salience of racial identity; certainly race can matter for
many reasons simultaneously. My objective is merely to develop the previously
unaddressed (at least within the economics literature) role of commitment in racial
identity.
39. For example, an individual whose social identity derives from the self-
categorization "white supremacist," and who has internalized the prescriptive norms of that
category, will suffer some loss of welfare by selling her home to someone she categorizes as
black, irrespective of the validity of that categorization. The homeowner may not sell to
the prospective black buyer or she may demand greater compensation from the buyer.
Given this costly possibility, the buyer may seek to influence the homeowner's
categorization of the buyer's race. In other words, if j's strategies are influenced by how
she categorizes i, then i may have an incentive to manipulate the social category in which j
places her by emphasizing or deemphasizing available attributes. Knowing that her social
category matters to a prospective transacting partner, a party will have an incentive to
manipulate her attributions. See Fryer & Jackson, supra note 38, at 23-24. She will also
have the incentive to signal her identity so as to influence the other person's categorization
of her and thus her value from the transaction. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The
Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 Yale L.J. 1757, 1760-61 (2003) (book
review) (observing that individuals have strong incentives to manage their race and other
aspects of their identity in professional settings). From an economic perspective, i's
strategy fits into the standard signaling model when the behavior is costly. However, when
the behavior is not costly to i, but in fact beneficial, then the strategy is better understood
in terms of an identity model.
40. Consider here Bruce Ackerman's categorization of "discrete" and "anonymous"
minorities, where "discrete" refers to minority groups whose "members are marked out in
ways that make it relatively easy for others to identify them . .. [while members of
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can credibly signal one's identity, and hence one's commitments. If so,
then others may rely on that signal in taking subsequent action.
I develop this signaling model of race more formally elsewhere, but
the description above is sufficient to convey the full economic intuition,
and for present purposes, it is enough to initially suggest a radically dif-
ferent antidiscrimination approach for courts. Instead of looking for an
individual's traits or attributes (immutable or not), courts should view
race and racial discrimination in terms of signals and their interpreta-
tions-that is, race can be seen as an interaction between individuals, and
not as some essential quality within individuals. Thus, if one observes a
signal (say, of racial identity) and takes some action based on that signal,
courts may find racial discrimination based purely on the interaction
around the signal without any reference to any true or underlying racial
essence. This view of antidiscrimination law is described in greater detail
in Part V, but for the present, let us maintain our focus on the economics
of corporate racial identity.
II. ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE RACIAL IDENTITY
Persons, including corporate persons, have strong incentive to de-
fine and manage their own identities, racial and otherwise. The People's
Pleasure Park Company-though "composed exclusively of negroes" and
established to serve "colored people"-explicitly contrived to dissociate
race from its business form. It did this, a hundred years ago, in order to
avoid the disabilities associated with being black in the Jim Crow South.
Some black-owned businesses, however, still struggle to avoid being dis-
abled by black identity. The contemporary detriment of being pigeon-
holed or straitjacketed by race is a nontrivial liability for many black en-
trepreneurs and their businesses. 41 These entrepreneurs therefore often
seek to limit the perception of their enterprises as "black," which may put
anonymous groups can] avoid easy identification." Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene
Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 729 (1985). But cf. Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Caroene
Products Reminiscence, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1105 n.72 (1982) ("As a matter of
language, 'discrete' means separate or distinct ... ."). To illustrate his point, Ackerman
observes, "there is nothing a black woman may plausibly do to hide the fact that she is
black or female .... In contrast . . . [a] homosexual, for example, can keep her sexual
preference a very private affair .... ." Ackerman, supra, at 729. But the costs of engaging in
performances that reveal or conceal identity is not merely a function of one's observable
attributes; it is also a function of one's internalized regulatory constraints on
performances. So it may be very costly for a homosexual to keep her sexual preference
private and not so costly for someone who considers herself to be "black"-but does not
meaningfully identify with the black community-to pass as "white."
41. The continuing disadvantage of being constrained by black (corporate) identity
in business has not gone unnoticed in the trade and popular presses. See, e.g., Ellis Cose,
The Rage of a Privileged Class 65 (1993) (describing "pigeonholing" generally and its
associated financial and psychic costs); Roger 0. Crockett, Invisible-and Loving It, Bus.
Wk., Oct. 5, 1998, at 124, 124 (describing black business owners' plight when seeking to
separate and conceal their race from their business); Gerda D. Gallop, The State of Small
Black Business, Black Enterprise, Nov. 1998, at 63, 68 (describing how minority corporate
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them directly at odds with Thinket's suggestion that federally-certified mi-
nority-owned corporations have racial character "as a matter of law." 42 A
black-owned corporation that does not wish to be viewed in the light cast
by Thinket will now have a disincentive to seek federal certification or to
use the corporate form. 43 This sets up an undesirable prospect, as fed-
eral certification serves an important function for black-owned businesses
(even for those that do not wish to be viewed exclusively as "black busi-
nesses"), and black-owned businesses seemingly are already underutiliz-
ing the corporate form. Table 1 shows that only an estimated 8.8% of all
black-owned enterprises are incorporated, compared to 21% for all firms,
24.1% for Asian and Pacific Islander-owned firms, and 12% for Hispanic-
owned firms. Black-owned firms are the least likely to take advantage of
incorporation. This pattern might be exacerbated if incorporation, as a
matter of law, no longer provides the racial anonymity so long desired-
at least in certain contexts-by black entrepreneurs.
On the other hand, some corporations explicitly seek to adopt and
emphasize the racial (or other) identity of their owners, agents, or cus-
tomers.4 4 For these corporations, adoption of a racial identity may fur-
ther their corporate goals of profit maximization, marketshare domi-
nance, employee and customer loyalty, or some other objective.
Emphasizing race in this way allows for identification with and hence
commitment to a racial category. Commitments of this sort can be costly,
but they can also be valuable. Individuals and firms, through their
choices and internal prescriptions, are best situated to assess the desirabil-
ity of such commitments and to act upon them.
A. Choices and Prescriptions
Economists Roland Fryer and Steve Levitt provide a good illustration
of the benefits and costs of identity commitments in their work on nam-
ing patterns in some African American communities. 45 The growth in
the assignment of distinctively "Black" names to children in these com-
munities is a little difficult to explain economically, given the pervasive
suppliers are "often lumped together with diversity initiates in human resources
departments").
42. Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th
Cir. 2004).
43. Managers of these corporations may worry that other firms will be less likely to
enter into contracts with them because of their imputed racial identity. On the other
hand, once there is a relationship, contracting partners may be less likely to behave in ways
that could be viewed as discriminatory.
44. For example, while the internet's "cool anonymity proves an advantage to [some]
minority business owners, allowing them to bypass real-life tensions by masking their racial
identity," other web-based minority business operations are "explicitly race-based."
Crockett, supra note 41, at 124, 128. "For a segment of ethnocentric black businesses...
the Internet's vast reach is more compelling than its anonymity." Id. at 128.
45. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, The Causes and Consequences of
Distinctively Black Names, 199 Q.J. Econ. 767, 767-71 (2004).
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TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF LEGAL BUSINESS FORMS FOR ALL FIRMS
AND BY OWNERS' RACEa
American Indian Asian & Pacific
Organizational Form All firms Black Hispanic & Alaska Native Islander
Total Incorporated 21.0% 8.8% 12.0% 9.7% 24.1%
C corp. 11.5% 5.2% 6.5% 4.8% 14.0%
Subchapter S corp. 9.5% 3.6% 5.5% 4.9% 10.1%
Partnership 5.9% 1.7% 2.3% 2.3% 4.5%
Ind. Proprietorship 72.6% 89.5% 85.6% 87.9% 71.0%
Other 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
'U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1997 Economic Census: Company Statistics
Series 3-14, 475-80 (2001). The legal organizational form "Other" includes cooperatives,
estates, receiverships, and businesses classified as unknown legal forms of organization. These
data are based on the 1997 economic census and surveys of minority- and women-owned
business enterprises reported in the 1997 Economic Census and the 1997 Survey of Minority
Enterprises, both conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau (Census). Census takes an economic
census every five years, in years ending in two and seven. These are the most current available
data. The 2002 data are scheduled to be released in the first two quarters of 2006. These data
include all nonfarm businesses filing 1997 tax forms with receipts of $1000 or more. Census
specifically relied on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) electronic files for all companies submitting
a 1997 Form 1040, Schedule C (individual proprietorship or self-employed person), a Form 1065
(partnership), Form 1120 (corporation tax forms), and Form 941 (Employer's Quarterly Federal
Tax Return). Based on administrative records from the IRS and the Social Security
Administration (SSA), as well as data from several other sources (including trade presses and
prior surveys), Census identified the probability that a business was minority-owned. This was
accomplished by taking Social Security Numbers (SSNs) from the tax file and merging these
SSNs with data (provided by the SSA) on the individual business owners' country of birth,
current surname, original surname, mother's maiden surname, and father's surname, as well as
reported race data in the categories: (a) Asian, Asian American, or Pacific Islander; (b)
Hispanic; (c) Black; (d) Northern American Indian or Alaskan Native; and (e) White. Six
separate sampling frames were used in the surveys of minority- and women-owned business
enterprises. Descriptions of the methodologies for both the economic census and the surveys of
minority- and women-owned business enterprises can be found in the 1997 Economic Census
and the 1997 Survey of Minority Enterprises.
view that individuals with such names are penalized in labor markets and
other social settings outside of the black community.4 6 Fryer and Levitt
attempt to account for this behavior by proposing and testing a number
of theoretical models, including an ignorance model (i.e., ignorance
46. This phenomenon is most evident in resume audit studies, where two identical
resumes-differing only in that one has a stereotypically Black name at the top while the
other has a more "traditional" name-are sent to prospective employers. Studies have
repeatedly shown that individuals bearing stereotypically Black names are less likely to get
callbacks forjob interviews. See, e.g., Barbara D. Bart et al., What's in a Name?, 12 Women
Mgmt. Rev. 299, 302-06 (1997); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily
and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination, 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 991, 991-92 (2004).
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among black parents) 47 a price theory model, 4 3 a signaling model, 49 and
an identity model. 50 Their data were most consistent with the identity
model, whereby giving a child a distinctively "Black" name parents in-
crease their own (and their child's) identification with the black commu-
nity.5t In the equilibrium of this model, there are no net costs to im-
parting a distinctively Black name on a child, since only authentically
identified blacks pursue this strategy. Economics Nobel Laureate George
Akerlof and his collaborator Rachel Kranton lay the foundation for this
model in their model of identity associated with "prescriptions," which
dictate utility-maximizing actions. "When an individual takes actions in
line with these prescriptions (e.g., a 'black' type choosing a distinctively
Black name, or a 'white' type choosing a White name), there is a utility
benefit. '52 We can similarly take two types of corporations (or two types
of owners of corporations), one type with a strong affinity or connection
to black communities and a second type with no affinity or connection to
these communities. In this framework, the former type will experience a
benefit by explicitly adopting a black racial identity, while the latter type
would suffer a loss if it racially identified itself as black. This result holds
even where both types of corporations are black-owned. Black-owned
corporations that are authentically race-neutral in their aspirations and
behaviors will endure net costs when they take actions consistent with the
prescriptions for black-community-affined corporations, and vice versa. It
is therefore profit maximizing for some black-owned businesses to organ-
47. Fryer and Levitt raise and dismiss the possibility of "ignorance on the part of Black
parents who unwittingly stigmatize their children with such names." Fryer & Levitt, supra
note 45, at 770-71.
48. In this model, parents choose names to maximize their children's expected utility,
where Black names are assumed to generate more utility in black communities. Id. at 788.
49. In their signaling model, Black names serve as a measure of one's affinity to the
black community, but names are not in and of themselves productive (i.e., not valuable).
There are two types of people-those with a strong affinity to the black community and
those with none. Everyone knows their own type, but not the types of others in the
community. Fryer and Levitt further assume that "[r]egardless of one's actual type, social
interactions in the black community yield higher utility if others believe that one has an
affinity for the black community." Id. at 789. So both types prefer to be viewed as having a
strong affinity since this perception yields a higher return. "One way in which an
individual signals his or her type is by the names that they choose for their children." Id.
Unlike the price theory model, where parents give their children distinctively Black names
to increase their children's utility, in the signaling model, parents impose otherwise costly
names on their children to signal the parent's authentic affinity to the black community
and therefore increase the parents' utility. It is important that the giving of a distinctively
Black name be "costly" to the parents (even if only indirectly through their children) for
the community members "to regard Black names as a [credible] signal of community
loyalty." Id.
50. The identity model is similar to the signaling model (in that distinctively Black
names continue to be costly for those without a true affinity to the black community) and
different from the signaling model (in that distinctively Black names are now a benefit-
not a cost-for those with authentic affinity to the black community).
51. Fryer & Levitt, supra note 45, at 792.
52. Id. at 791.
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ize their transactions under the veil of a black corporate personality,
while others would find it optimal to clothe their transactions with a de-
liberate measure of racial ambiguity or anonymity.
B. Investments and Commitments
Beyond viewing identity through the lens of "prescriptions," my prin-
cipal orientation is to view identity as a form of "commitment." This un-
derstanding points to another efficiency purpose served by private adop-
tion of corporate racial identity: investment efficiency. To see this point,
consider again the parent debating whether to give her child a distinc-
tively Black name despite the perceived market penalties. Parents who
strongly identify with the black community and who derive utility from its
advancement might naturally wish to impart these preferences to their
children; they may also reasonably want the community to support and
invest in their children's development and growth. By choosing distinc-
tively Black names, these parents may further these aims not only through
an expressive channel, but also through an explicitly economic one.
Ironically, the economic rationale is supported by the perceived penalties
for distinctively Black names. That is, a distinctively Black name increases
a child's commitment to the black community by limiting his outside op-
tions. The community, in turn, will have more incentive to invest in the
child, knowing that he is less likely to walk away and appropriate the re-
turns of the community's contribution to him.53
Suggesting such calculation on the part of parents will undoubtedly
strike some readers as crass, but we ought not fool ourselves. Parents
utilize many devices to bind their children to cared-for communities-
religious, racial, and others-and these devices are often supported by
broad social customs and laws. The common law of trusts, for example,
permits the enforcement of trusts that vest only if a child marries within
the faith or that divest if he marries "a person of a certain race." 54 One
might interpret Wisconsin v. Yoder, where an Amish community sought
and received an exemption from the state's mandatory education re-
quirement,55 as an instance where the Court supported parental desires
53. See the holdup theory of the firm, Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial
Structure 27-28 (1995) [hereinafter Hart, Firms]; Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic
Institutions of Capitalism 15-26 (1985); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297, 324-35
(1978).
54. See Gareth H. Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in Death, Taxes and
Family Property 119, 127 (Edward C. Halbach ed., 1977); cf. John H. Langbein, Mandatory
Rules in the Laws of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1105, 1109-10 (2004) ("The cases (and
indeed the Restatements) have divided about whether to sustain such a term." (footnotes
omitted)).
55. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) ("[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the
State from compelling respondents to cause their children to attend formal high school to
age 16.").
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to restrict children to an insular community by limiting their options. 56
Of course, these matters cannot be reduced to a purely utilitarian
calculus, but neither are these parental decisions to identify their chil-
dren with certain communities entirely nonconsequentialist.
57
C. Efficient Identities
By explicitly identifying a corporation with a racial or ethnic group,
corporate promoters (parents, of sorts) can increase investment from
that group, ultimately advancing both the corporation's and the group's
interests. I am not here calling for a stakeholder approach to corporate
practice, nor am I arguing against such an approach. 58 My commitment
model is agnostic on the issue of whether corporate managers owe, or
should owe, any fiduciary obligations to nonshareholder interests.
Rather than underscoring potential conflicts between shareholder and
nonshareholder interests, this model pays heed to intertemporal conflicts
within shareholders. Corporate racial adoption can efficiently respond to
time-inconsistent shareholder preferences. Adding race to the corporate
personality may allow managers a way to better commit to long-run,
profit-maximizing strategies.
The efficiency of personifying the corporation in this manner may
be most easily observed within the "nexus of contracts" model of the cor-
poration. Interestingly enough, the scholars credited with developing
this model, Michael Jensen and William Meckling, argued exactly the op-
posite point in their foundational piece.59 In their view, the nexus of
56. This is an admittedly pessimistic interpretation, and the opinion clearly suggests
that the parents in that case were motivated by genuine concern for their children's
emotional and spiritual welfare. Id. at 209. Still, the opinion also revealed that the parents
were concerned about "the impact that compulsory high school attendance could have on
the continued survival of Amish communities as they exist in the United States today." Id.
57. Appiah raises important nonconsequentialist concerns about the desirability of
such "internal restriction, inasmuch as it constrains the opportunities of the younger
generations, impedes their right of exit, and so infringes on the autonomy of their future
selves." Appiah, Identity, supra note 36, at 78-80.
58. See generally R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder
Approach (1984) (arguing that management strategies must take account of different
stakeholders in organization); Cheryl Carleton Asher et al., Towards a Property Rights
Foundation for a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm, 9 J. Mgmt. & Governance 5 (2005)
(advocating new perspective on stakeholder theory of the firm); Margaret M. Blair, Closing
the Theory Gap: How the Economic Theory of Property Rights Can Help Bring
"Stakeholders" Back into Theories of the Firm, 9 J. Mgmt. & Governance 33 (2005)
(commenting on and lauding article by Asher et al.). Many of the modern arguments on
both sides were identified long ago by E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 passim (1932) and A.A. Berle, Jr., Note, For
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 passim (1932).
59. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. Fin. Econ. 305, 311 (1976) (" Thefirm
is not an individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in
which the conflicting objectives of individuals ... are brought into equilibrium within a
framework of contractual relations.").
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contracts model of the corporation makes "clear that the personalization
of the firm . . . is seriously misleading."60 But they claimed too much
here. There is no necessary inconsistency between the nexus of contracts
fiction and corporate personality.6 1 In fact, a personified corporation
can be an efficient contractual commitment.
To see this, take the corporation to be a nexus of N contracts be-
tween the firm and various contracting parties, including shareholders,
employees, suppliers, customers, and so on, indexed by i = {1, 2, 3,...,
N}. Define the value that the firm derives from each contract as vi(ei),
where ei is some measure of effort or investment that the firm's con-
tracting party, i, makes. Assume that investments positively affect the
firm's value of the contract, but they are noncontractible-which is to say
the parties cannot write an enforceable contract that specifies the invest-
ment level that i ought to take because investments are unobservable,
unverifiable, indescribable, or otherwise prohibitively costly to enforce. 62
For instance, the firm may want an employee to make some unobservable
relationship-specific investment (e.g., human capital development spe-
cific to the firm) or it may desire that a supplier make some noncon-
tractible asset-specific investment. 63 Suppose the contract is jointly more
valuable if the employee or the supplier makes some high level of invest-
ment. The problem, however, is that after the employee or supplier
makes the investment, they are subject to being held up by the firm
through some implicit or explicit renegotiation of the original noncon-
60. Id.
61. Jensen and Meckling preferred to see the corporation as operating like a market
rather than a person. Yet, whether the firm is more like "a market," or like "a machine," or
like "a team," or like some other creature or thing familiar to us, as opposed to being like
"a person," is really a contest of metaphors. For the team metaphor, see Armen A. Alchian
& Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am.
Econ. Rev. 777 passim (1977). For the machine metaphor, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights,
Persons, and Organizations 46-51 (1986). Frank Kirkpatrick applies the machine
metaphor to associations broadly, identifying it in the liberal philosophies of Thomas
Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Frank G. Kirkpatrick, Community:
A Trinity of Models 16, 18, 29, 33 (1986). In some contexts the market analogy is apt (as
long ago suggested by Ronald Coase in his 1937 classic article The Nature of the Firm. R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937)). In other contexts, the person
and machine fictions are more useful. But there is no ultimate truth or "cognitive
necessity" with regard to any of these fictions. These fictions are deployed simply to
persuade, an aim that motivates and animates both legal and economic argument. See
Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics passim (1985); Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale
L.J. 16, 20-22 (1913). The corporation as "a person," "a team," "a market," "a machine,"
and as "a creature of the state," are all metaphors invoked to advance particular
arguments.
62. See Eric Maskin &Jean Tirole, Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature, 66
Rev. Econ. Stud. 139, 146 (1999).
63. For example, "the firm may wish to persuade a worker to engage in a lengthy
apprenticeship at a low wage in return for the promise of a higher wage later if the worker
becomes skilled." Oliver Hart, An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. Toronto L.J.
299, 306 (1993) [hereinafter Hart, Economist's View].
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tractible agreement. Even if the firm's management does not wish to do
so, a single shareholder may compel the corporation to engage in some
activity consistent with shareholder primacy but inconsistent with the op-
timum ex ante prescribed behavior of the parties. Fearing the possibility
of being held up, employees and suppliers will have reduced incentives to
invest, lowering the value of the contracts with the firm: the "holdup
problem."64 If, however, the firm could credibly commit to not renegoti-
ate, then incentives to invest optimally may be maintained and the
holdup problem avoided.
65
Parties' ex ante desires are often subverted by their ability to renego-
tiate arrangements ex post.66 Whether they can credibly commit to "no
renegotiation" and what form that commitment might take are substan-
tial questions. Game theorists Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole suggest that
contracting parties could include irrevocable clauses in their contracts,
prohibiting renegotiation and stipulating large legally enforceable penal-
ties (i.e., liquidated damage clauses) if renegotiation occurs. 67 Of course,
these clauses may themselves be renegotiated by the parties. Maskin and
Tirole respond to this challenge by pointing out that "[the] parties could
in principle register their contract [clauses] publicly and play out the
mechanism before an arbitrator."68 American courts, however, have
shown great reluctance to enforce large liquidated damage clauses.6 9 Yet
despite this institutional constraint, it is certainly true that parties can
credibly commit to "no renegotiation" in varying forms and degrees. 70
Taking on an identity is one way a corporation may, to a nontrivial
degree, increase its commitment to various contracting partners, such as
customers, employees, and suppliers. The corporation may, for instance,
stipulate in its articles of incorporation that the entity's legal personality
64. See Bernard Salanie, The Economics of Contracts 175-88 (1997); Patrick W.
Schmitz, The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in
Contract Theory, 53 Bull. Econ. Res. 1, 4 (2001).
65. "It would be better for the firm if shareholders could commit themselves not to
claim back money from workers and suppliers ex post. One way to do this is to broaden
the scope of fiduciary duty to include workers and suppliers." Hart, Firms, supra note 53,
at 306. For example, the 1994 reorganization of United Airlines resulted in a charter that
gave nonshareholder employees and other constituents the right to nominate directors, to
give them some control, and perhaps to afford them some fiduciary obligations from the
board. See Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 117-18 (1996).
66. The tale of Ulysses and the sirens represents the classic instance of this
phenomenon. See John Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality 65-68
(1979).
67. Eric Maskin &Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts,
66 Rev. Econ. Stud. 83, 99 (1999).
68. Id. (footnotes omitted).
69. See Arron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 33, 36 (2003).
70. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 Rev.
Econ. Stud. 115, 116 (1999) ("[T]he degree of commitment is something about which
reasonable people can disagree: both cases-where there is and where there is not
commitment-are worthy of study.").
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shall hereafter be associated with some chosen social identity. By using
the charter for this purpose, the corporation's commitment to that iden-
tity and associated others is publicly registered (as suggested by Maskin
and Tirole). Promoters generally have strong incentives to choose effi-
cient identities (i.e., ones that maximize returns over the nexus of con-
tracts) for inclusion in the corporate charter, including no explicit iden-
tity or a proshareholder identity. 71 All of this, of course, is nothing new.
Businesses that pursue not-for-profit incorporation, and those that adver-
tise themselves as socially responsible, and even those that display alle-
giance to shareholder primacy are all making public commitments to cer-
tain practices and communities of individuals.
By explicitly adopting an identity (racial, religious, or other), a cor-
poration may commit to strategies that maximize perceived long-run firm
value even when challenged by more myopic impulses. For example, the
large Netherlands IT company, Baan, founded by the so-called brothers
Baan, quite explicitly associated a religious identity with the corporate
entity.72 And though "[i]n the end, the brothers couldn't have it both
ways," as the "enterprise could not be both commercial and religious," 73
it is worth noting that as the company struggled, the employees (many of
whom shared the religious identity associated with the entity) rewarded
the firm for its commitment by praying for its success and remaining with
the firm for a longer period than they may have otherwise.7 4 Further-
more, even the act of categorizing the corporate entity into specified ra-
cial, religious, or other groups (by the entity's fiduciaries) may increase
the commitment of those fiduciaries to the group. Psychologists in the
subfields of social identity theory and categorization theory have empiri-
cally identified a connection between the process of categorizing others
(and self) and group commitment-though the precise psychological
71. Oliver Hart has explained this phenomenon:
The reason is that as long as the founders sell their claims (equity, debt, etc.) in a
competitive market, the total amount they receive reflects the present value of
returns on all claims taken together. An exception occurs if some claimholder
(or stakeholder) cannot be charged for its future return up front.
Hart, Economist's View, supra note 63, at 309 n.25. On the founder's creation of identity
(and culture) in a firm, see Edgar H. Schein, The Role of the Founder in Creating
Organizational Culture, Org. Dynamics, Summer 1983, at 13, 13 ("An organization's
founder.., by force of his or her personality, begins to shape the group's culture.").
72. See Stephen Baker, The Fall of Baan: How the Effort to Create a Silicon Valley
Star in the Old World Failed, Bus. Wk., Aug. 28, 2000, at 247, 247-48 (noting that Baan
brothers, both members of conservative Dutch Reform Church, caused their company to
suffer "a fatal split, one represented by the brothers and their dual fascinations: God and
geld").
73. Id. at 248.
74. See Naomi Ellemers et al., Self and Social Identity, 53 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 161, 164
(2002) ("[W]hen profits plummeted, instead of leaving for a more financially sound
company, employees started daily prayers in the hope that the firm might yet be saved
from bankruptcy.").
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mechanisms through which commitment to the group emerges are not
well understood. 75
Judges too have affirmed the legal salience of adopted corporate
identity and its implications for commitment to nonshareholder interests.
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. Shareholder
Litigation) ,76 the court rationalized Time's use of defensive tactics, at a
significant loss to immediate shareholder returns, based on Time's "iden-
tity and culture." 77 Time argued that its identity and culture implied a
commitment to its customers and employees (for journalistic integrity)
that should take priority over its commitment to maximizing short-run
shareholder returns. Of course, by weakening its commitment to its
shareholders, Time has more discretion to hold them up, which may lead
to reduced shareholder investment. On the other hand, there may be
increased value and greater expected returns to shareholders from a
firm's commitment to other parties, which can offset the expected hold-
up costs of weakened shareholder commitment. A firm in this case ulti-
mately faces tradeoffs between increasing shareholder investment and in-
vestments from other parties. What is the best strategy? That is unclear.
The answer will depend on the circumstances and objectives of the partic-
ular firm. However, what is clear is that the firm, if it is a nexus of con-
tracts, should seek to optimize value across the sum of its contracts-not
just shareholder contracts. This optimization may imply a noncontrac-
tual commitment to nonshareholders-for example, adoption of corpo-
rate racial identity-which can leave both the firm and its shareholders
better off.
Given the economic potential from racializing corporations, it is a
little surprising that it did not happen sooner; why did we not see, for
instance, parties organizing businesses as legally "white" persons during
the Jim Crow period? In fact, some legislatures-both domestic and for-
eign-in the past did seek to restrict stock ownership by race and to de-
termine the racial content of incorporated entities, but courts have re-
sisted these practices. The next two Parts show that there were a number
of reasons for this judicial restraint, based significantly on the political
and economic context in which relevant transactions arose.
III. THE JIM CROW POLrrICAL ECONOMY OF RACED PERSONS
A number of intriguing possibilities are revealed in the overlapping
history of racial and corporate formation. The inquiry here, however, is
limited. This Part will neither review nor revive stale debates over the
"real" versus "social" bases of race or of corporate personhood. Much has
75. See id. at 180 ("This question [of how group commitment emerges] has not been
a high priority in social psychological research in which commitment [has] often been
treated as an independent variable.").
76. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
77. Id. at 1149.
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been written on each of these fictions, and in isolation, I have little new to
add. However, taken together and focusing on their intersection, promi-
nent facets of each are revealed. For instance, the vital role of the corpo-
rate veil (a related fiction) in separating liabilities and obligations of
shareholders from the corporation takes on new salience in the join of
these constructs. From there, one can also clearly observe the fluidity of
race. Immutability is difficult to maintain when race is connected to (or,
indeed, defined by) ownership interests that are predicated on ease of
transferability. 78 Racial identity in strictly legal persons not only makes
the social construction of race plainly observable (absent the distractions
of biology and deceptions of appearances), but it also reveals the practi-
cal and political -instability of the construct in a dramatic fashion.
A. Civil Rights and Creditors' Rights
It is from such a practical and political perspective that one must
view the refusal of courts to attribute race to corporations during Jim
Crow. This was a momentous decision, "and it can well be believed that
the Courts which had to consider it had no desire to let any mere techni-
cality suppress the obvious demands of' the state's segregationist policy. 79
But why would a Southern court allow a former slave to use a corporate
shell to purchase land that he could not have acquired in his own capac-
ity? Why did the courts refuse to pierce the corporate veil or to attribute
race to the entity, when so much else was raced?80 The answers to these
questions are to be found in the political settlement between the North
and the South over equality rights following the Civil War.
Equality rights in the wake of the Civil War were understood along
three distinct lines: civil, political, and social. Civil equality and political
equality were differentiated, though both were ultimately subject to de
jure enforcement;8 ' social equality was another matter entirely-a matter
78. On the fluidity of race across jurisdictions, see Donald Braman's treatment of
Plessy v. Ferguson. Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1375,
1393-400 (1999). On the fluidity of race within persons, see Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707, 1716-18 (1993).
79. Hallis, supra note 6, at xlviii. The passage is borrowed from Frederick Hallis's
discussion of a similar refusal by English courts to treat a corporation held and controlled
by Germans as an enemy of the state during World War 1. For further discussion of Hallis's
views on the potential for the legal form of the corporation to obscure underlying social
realities, see infra note 212.
80. This is not meant to suggest that piercing the veil and attributing race to the entity
are equivalent. Veil piercing primarily operates to protect creditors by attributing
corporate liabilities to individual shareholders, while "racing" corporations protects
shareholders by attributing their characteristics to the entity.
81. Political equality, which implied equal rights to vote, hold political office, and sit
on juries, was not the same as civil equality, which implied, inter alia, equal rights to make
and enforce contracts or to hold and transfer property. "The distinction between civil and
political equality was important to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment because
many of them did not want blacks to have the right to vote, to say nothing of women." Jack
M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter. A Play in Three Acts, Mimeo 7 (2005) (unpublished
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largely thought beyond the enforcement powers of courts and legisla-
tures. 82 The conventional understanding held that the social hierarchy
was determined by nature and, if anything, the state should intervene
only to preserve that natural order-not to level it.8 3 This view author-
ized one hundred years of state regulation of interracial association
through the establishment of black hospitals, railcars, schools, and so
forth. But why not black corporations?
Had the People's Pleasure Park Company been a partnership or
some other unincorporated business, the racially restrictive covenant
would not have been defeated as it was.8 4 Importantly, corporations were
not then, nor now, viewed as associations of coventurers, as partnerships,
for instance, were.8 5 Under the existing segregation mandate, the state
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review). This distinction, prominent in
congressional debates at the time, was "why the Fifteenth Amendment, giving black men
the right to vote, was thought necessary." Id; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights,
Creation and Reconstruction 216-18, 258-61, 271-74 (1998) (discussing "legal distinction
between civil and political rights").
82. Social equality was viewed as beyond the state's power to effectuate. See Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) ("If the two races are to meet upon terms of social
equality, it must be the result of natural affinities .... Legislation is powerless to eradicate
racial instincts.... ."); see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1127 (1997)
("Thus, considered in retrospect, the distinction between civil and political, on the one
hand, and social rights on the other, helps explain juridical differences in the rule
structure of racial status regulation enacted in the decades following the Civil War.");
Balkin, supra note 81, at 7 ("Social equality and social inequality were not the business of
the state."). Not all commentators agree that the distinctions were so clear. See Amar,
supra note 81, at 216-18, 258-61 (discussing recharacterization during Reconstruction of
right to bear arms as civil, rather than political, right); Richard A. Primus, The American
Language of Rights 154-57 (1999) ("[Mlany rights were not clearly fixed in one category
or another."); Balkin, supra note 81, at 6 ("What fell into each category was always
somewhat contested . . . ." (footnote omitted)).
83. Balkin references antimiscegenation laws as an example of state intervention to
maintain the social hierarchy. Mixed race children would blur racial distinctions and thus
"affect the status of other members of [a] social group without their consent. Hence the
state's intervention [was] not only not seen as futile, [but] as necessary to preserve racial
identity and racial status." Balkin, supra note 81, at 8. This view of miscegenation as
threatening group status allowed states to "continue to prohibit interracial sex or
interracial marriage consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 7-8.
84. The People's Pleasure Park controversy preceded the Uniform Partnership Act
(U.P.A.) by almost a decade, but one might still look to section 8(3) of the Act, which
explicitly recognizes that real estate may be acquired in the partnership name, to argue
that a partnership may have also served as a suitable vehicle for African American
purchasers. U.P.A. § 8(3) (1914) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 532 (2001). However,
the partnership would have been treated as a group of "colored" persons by the association
theory of partnership. See id. § 6 ("A partnership is an association of two or more persons
to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."). Thus, the partnership form would not
have circumvented the covenant because the race of individual partners would have been
relevant.
85. There was a period in American corporate law when challengers of the corporate
person fiction had some success in their efforts to have the common law conceptualize and
regulate corporations as partnerships. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The
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may have felt some authority to regulate, an interracial association of
coventurers (though even this, I think, would have been unlikely) ,86 but
shareholders are not in association with each other. They are atomistic
rights claimants over the corporation. They hold contractual and prop-
erty rights-as residual claimants-on the corporation; and these are civil
rights clearly subject to court enforcement.8 7 These protected rights
would have been compromised if the state racialized the corporation.88
Beyond the civil rights of shareholders, the rights of corporate credi-
tors were also at stake in the decision over whether to racialize corpora-
tions. Corporate creditors extend credit knowing that assets owned by a
corporation are not available to satisfy creditors of the individual share-
holders. In other words, a corporation is not responsible for its share-
holders' personal liabilities. This directive is the functional counterpart
to shareholder limited liability (i.e., the shareholder is not personally lia-
ble for the corporation's obligations). Together these reciprocal re-
straints create a tidy partition of the assets and liabilities of sharehold-
ers.89 Without this partition, corporate investors would invest less and
incur higher monitoring costs. Reduced investment and higher costs
would result because if coinvestors had significant personal debt, which
creditors could collect from the corporation, then other shareholders
would end up contributing to the bill. Indeed, the bill would ultimately
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 182 (1985); see also William W.
Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 Cornell L.
Rev. 407, 424 (1989) (describing nineteenth century "consensus picture" of corporations,
that "[t]he corporate entity represented a state-created juridical structure only-a 'legal
fiction'" that was conceptually different from actual conduct of corporate business, which,
"like that conducted by individuals and partnerships, was a contractual aggregate");
discussion infra notes 221-222. However, Anglo-American common law has not for the
most part embraced an associational view of the corporation. See infra notes 203-207 and
accompanying text.
86. Even though partnerships were conceived of as associations of individuals, they
were also contracts and therefore subject to protection under the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
Still, the contractual rights of prospective interracial marital partners and train passengers
were often defeated by the state's interests in regulating interracial association. See Siegel,
supra note 82, at 1122-25.
87. "[C]itizens . . . of every race . . . shall have the same right[s] . . . to make and
enforce contracts .... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property. . . ,as is enjoyed by white citizens .... " Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14
Stat. 27, 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000)).
88. Just as states could not zone a neighborhood by race following Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917), neither could they "race" a corporation. In this sense, one
might look at the nonracializing of corporations as a precedent to Buchanan. In Buchanan,
the Court felt that the legislation was less about "social rights" than "fundamental rights in
property" or civil rights, that is, "the civil right of a white man to dispose of his property...
to a person of color and of a colored person to make such disposition to a white person."
Id. at 79-81.
89. These restraints also create a partition of the assets and liabilities of shareholders
and the corporation, but presently I wish to emphasize the separation among
shareholders.
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be paid by not just other shareholders, but corporate creditors generally,
like commercial lenders, employees, suppliers, and other trade creditors.
All these parties would be exposed to greater financial liability if cor-
porations were raced at this time. Had the court in People's Pleasure Park
ruled the corporation black, asset partitioning would have been defeated
by attributing a liability (disability) of the owners of the corporate stock
to the corporation itself. Permitting this to be done even in this one con-
text would increase the information costs of dealing with corporate assets
in all contexts, since creditors (broadly defined) would have to worry
about whether a corporation will be treated as though it has a disadvanta-
geous racial identity (because of the race of its owners) and hence be
subject to additional liabilities (disabilities) relative to white-owned or un-
raced corporations."° This would not have been a trivial concern for in-
vestors and creditors in the world of Jim Crow.
The court's refusal to "race" corporations one hundred years ago
becomes somewhat more comprehensible in light of these legal (civil
rights) and practical (creditors' rights) concerns. Yet these concerns are
still with us, as contemporary courts attribute race to these legal persons
without much hand wringing. What has changed is that we no longer live
in a world that enforces racial covenants and the like. 9 1 This fact under-
scores the broadest reason why courts previously did not attribute race to
strictly legal persons. Doing so would have revealed the unadorned legal
construction of race and undermined the political and social regime of
that period. Therefore, to fully appreciate the ruling in People's Pleasure
Park one must situate it within the then extant social and political
context.
B. People's Pleasure Park
Where is the Jim Crow section
On this merry-go-round,
Mister, cause I want to ride?
Down South where I come from
White and colored
Can't sit side by side.
Down South on the train
There's a Jim Crow car.
On the bus we're put in the back-
But there ain't no back
To a merry-go-round!
90. To take a simple example, note that the seller of property covered by racially
restrictive covenants might have to verify the racial identity of corporate buyers up to the
point of the sale in order to avoid liability and consequent damages or divestitures.
91. Racially restrictive covenants still resonate, however. See, e.g., Julian Walker,
Woman Seeks $100,000 in Damages in Housing Bias Suit, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec.
8, 2005, at B2 (describing recent case in which black prospective buyer sued white
homeowner who allegedly refused to sell to blacks on basis of racially restrictive covenant).
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Where's the horse
For a kid that's black?92
The controversy over the racial identity of the People's Pleasure Park
Company began at the turn of the twentieth century, when the last chil-
dren born into slavery werejust approaching middle age, and white ideal-
ization of the Old South and the Civil War soared, particularly in Rich-
mond, Virginia, the seat of the Confederacy. 9 3 "Socially, Richmond was
two cities-one white, one black.... By the late [1880s] official segrega-
tion in Richmond had reached the point that white and black children
were walking to and from school on separate sides of the street."94 White
and black prostitutes also walked on separate streets, and "[i]f taken to
court, [they] would likely have found the spectators racially separated,
and perhaps, like the procedure in Savannah's mayor's court in 1876,
they would have sworn on a Bible set aside for their particular race. '9 5
Law and custom mandated segregation of not only physical spaces, 9 6
but also activities-especially social activities. 97 Motivated in large part by
the rhetoric of protecting white women from black men,98 interracial
92. Langston Hughes, Merry-Go-Round: Colored Child at Carnival, in The Panther
and the Lash 92, 92 (1974).
93. Leon F. Litwack, Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age ofJim Crow 185
(1998) ("Between 1890 and World War I, white Southerners went to extraordinary lengths
to mythologize the past, to fantasize an Old South, a Civil War, a Reconstruction, and a
Negro that conformed to the images they preferred to cherish.").
94. Leon Fink, Workingmen's Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American
Politics 150 (1983) [hereinafter Fink, Workingmen's Democracy] (discussing segregation
in Richmond in late 1880s).
95. Howard N. Rabinowitz, From Exclusion to Segregation: Southern Race Relations,
1865-1890, 63 J. Am. Hist. 325, 337 (1976). "[I]n the courtroom of the Radical circuit
court judge in Richmond, whites sat on the west side and blacks on the east." Id. at 332.
See also Litwack, supra note 93, at 246, for his description of the Jim Crow Bible in a North
Carolina courtroom.
96. Prisons, for example, were required to be segregated, but overcrowding often
prevented full segregation. At one point, Alabama prison authorities dealt with this
problem by placing "white women convicted of adultery with blacks [in] the same cells as
Negro women." Rabinowitz, supra note 95, at 340. Not only were schools and libraries
segregated, but a North Carolina law also prohibited the exchanging of books between
black and white schools. See N.C. Gen. Star. § 115-294 (1944) (repealed 1955), reprinted
in States' Laws on Race and Color 331 (Pauli Murray ed., 1997). Murray offers a
comprehensive list of laws relating to segregation in graveyards, hospitals, insane asylums,
restaurants, inns, hotels, and so on. See States' Laws on Race and Color, supra.
97. The South was more concerned with policing the interracial social environment
than the physical one. See 2 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem
and Modern Democracy 606-21 (Transaction Publishers 1996) (1944).
98. After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Raleigh Sentinel expressed a
common sentiment among many Southern whites: "[T]he negro will be forced upon ...
[the white man's] wife, and his daughter, on the cars .... in theatres and other places of
amusement." Rabinowitz, supra note 95, at 333 (quoting Raleigh Sentinel, Aug. 2, 1875).
This sentiment was also observable in the People's Pleasure Park trial transcript, which in
significant part focused on "a drunken negro, [who came] down from Richmond on the
car on a Sunday morning and insulted a white lady," and the behavior of "suspenderless"
and "shirtless" negro men. Transcript of Record at 220-22, People's Pleasure Park Co. v.
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dancing, dating, and intimacy were severely punished,9 9 as were interra-
cial fishing, boxing, and other sports, as well as pool halls, race tracks,
theaters, parks, beaches, circuses, and other "tent shows." 100 White
Southerners did not take incursions across the color line lightly. For in-
stance, when the Knights of Labor held their 1886 General Assembly in
Richmond, 10 Frank Ferrell, a black Knight from New York, attended a
performance of Hamlet'0 2 at the city's most exclusive theater.'0 3 "This
breach of racial mores created a furor" throughout the city, with the "po-
lice, forty deputies, and a hastily organized 'Law and Order League"' tak-
ing posts outside the elite theater the following evening to prevent any
further violations.'0 4 Matters were no less controlled at the other end of
the social hierarchy. Indeed, a key point of contention in the People's
Pleasure Park litigation was whether, and to what extent, blacks and whites
were seen eating at the same table in the local dive near the company's
property. It also did not help the company's case that the property at
issue was located on hallowed Confederate grounds.
Rohleder, 61 S.E. 794 (Va. 1908) (No. 135) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter People's Pleasure Park Record] (deposition of J.W. Camp); id. at 110
(deposition of R.A. Rohleder); see also id. at 155 (deposition of A.F. Craddock); id. at
158-59 (deposition of F.P. Watson); id. at 169 (deposition of Mrs. C.E. Dawson); id. at
175-76 (deposition of J.D. Clark); id. at 219 (deposition of W.C. Vincient).
99. See Randall Kennedy, Interracial Intimacies: Sex, Marriage, Identity, and
Adoption 216-23 (2003); Rachel F. Moran, Interracial Intimacy: The Regulation of Race
and Romance 18-28 (2001).
100. See States' Laws on Race and Color, supra note 96, at 17; Rabinowitz, supra note
95, at 327-28, 331-32.
101. Major Joseph B. Johnson was an influential member of the Knights and likely
had something to do with the choice of Richmond for their General Assembly. He was the
official organizer of Richmond's Knights of Labor District Assembly 92, "composed entirely
of Negro members . . . with . . . membership of 1,285." Sidney H. Kessler, The
Organization of Negroes in the Knights of Labor, 37 J. Negro Hist. 248, 258 (1952)
(citation omitted); see Rachleff, supra note 1, at 127. "Black workers were best organized
in Richmond." Kenneth Kann, The Knights of Labor and the Southern Black Worker, 18
Lab. Hist. 49, 54 (1977). And the Knights were "a powerful local force" there. Fink,
Workingmen's Democracy, supra note 94, at 155.
102. Michael Ayres Trotti, When Coney Island Arrived in Richmond, 51 Va. Cavalcade
168, 171 (2002).
103. Kann, supra note 101, at 60-61. Ferrell's attendance may have been intended to
challenge the heightened discrimination to which he was exposed in Richmond. He likely
stayed at the St. Charles Hotel. "[T]he St. Charles [was] the only Richmond hotel to
accept a black delegate to the 1886 Knights of Labor convention [and] gave him second-
class quarters and seated him at a table in the dining room farthest from the door and
behind a screen." Rabinowitz, supra note 95, at 336. It is important to emphasize that it
was not Major Johnson, nor the other black members of District Assembly 92, who crossed
the color line. They knew better. "[T]he Negro in Richmond, Virginia, regardless of his
legal rights, knew 'how far he may go, and where he must stop."' Id. at 349. "Breaking the
color line . . .was even more difficult for Southern Knights than achieving harmony in
economic struggles." Kann, supra note 101, at 59.
104. Trotti, supra note 102, at 171. "Amidst this swirl of controversy, Knights leaders
cautiously retreated [and] immediately assured white Richmond the visiting Knights would
not challenge the color line again." Kann, supra note 101, at 62.
2006] 2049
HeinOnline -- 106 Colum. L. Rev. 2049 2006
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
The land in question, located just outside of Richmond, witnessed
some of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War. 10 5 It was sold by the heirs
of Samuel Mosby to Bliss and Blanche Black of Boston on January 19,
1900.106 The Blacks platted the roughly 125 acre site into 1,330 lots
under the name "Fulton Park" with the intention of establishing a settle-
ment for "white persons." 10 7 In many ways an ideal site for a suburban
settlement, Fulton Park was located across the street from the Fair Oaks
Station at the intersection of two rail lines: the Southern Railway and the
electric streetcar running from Richmond. The streetcar trolley from
Richmond stopped directly across from the amusement park built by the
Blacks to attract home buyers.' 08
Unfortunately for the Blacks, several Richmond streetcar companies
had already developed "suburban parks at the ends of their lines."10 9
These suburban trolley parks and numerous amusement alternatives in
Richmond left little demand for the Blacks' white-only amusement park.
The Blacks were also flustered by competition in residential development
along the trolley line. Local developer Edmond Read started selling lots
close to Fair Oaks Station in 1892, the year "the owners of the railroad
applied for permission to electrify it and run streetcars instead of
trains."'110 Major Sol Cutchins also platted "Shelton Park" the same year
as, and directly adjacent to, Fulton Park. 1 ' For these and other rea-
sons, 112 the Fulton Park settlement failed, selling only thirty out of the
thirteen hundred lots to twelve purchasers. Three of those lots were ulti-
mately transferred to Florence E. Rohleder, the named plaintiff in
Rohleder v. People's Pleasure Park Co., who used the property as a residence
for herself and her husband, Richard, also known as Dick. 113
105. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 471 (1988).
"Immediately following the war, in 1866, [the battleground] was selected as the site for a
national cemetery." Carlton Norris McKenney, Rails in Richmond 107 (1986).
106. Deed of Purchase (Dec. 18, 1877) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(recording sale of plot of land by A.B. Apperson to Samuel Mosby in Henrico County,
Virginia); People's Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 148-49 (petitioner's facts).
107. People's Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 1-2 (petitioner's facts); Petition
for Rehearing, supra note 4, at 1-2.
108. The Blacks were familiar with the amusement business as owners of the Revere
Beach Country Fair and Musical Railway Company. See People's Pleasure Park Record, supra
note 98, at 2 (petitioner's facts).
109. The streetcar companies did this to profit from the amusement sales and to "fill
the trolleys during off-peak hours." Trotti, supra note 102, at 172; see also Rabinowitz,
supra note 95, at 337-39 (discussing segregation and integration in parks built at ends of
streetcar lines).
110. McKenney, supra note 105, at 107.
111. There was a strip of land forming part of Fulton Park that ran between Shelton
Park and Nine Mile Road. See People's Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 143
(deposition of J.W. Powers); Shelton Park Map, Figure 1, infra text accompanying note
138.
112. See infra notes 132-134 and accompanying text.
113. Richard Rohleder, acting as an agent for Florence, purchased Lots 93, 94, 95,
and Block F on the corner of Powell Street and Virginia Avenue from John W. Powers and
[Vol. 106:20232050
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Dick Rohleder did not care for African Americans. He once said
that he "personally suffered nearly every indignity and all the odium that
the presence of large numbers of idle and depraved negroes could put on
any man of refinement."" 14 On April Fool's Day, 1906, after overhearing
that Fulton Park was under contract "to colored persons" he raced to
Bliss Black's managing agent, David G. Fulton, to disconfirm the ru-
mor.1 1 5 Unsatisfied with Fulton's assurances that he would "refuse any
offer" from "these negroes," Dick encouraged his wife, Florence, to file a
preliminary injunction to stop the sale.' 16 The injunction was granted on
April 10, 1906. t 17 The Rohleders, however, were unable to meet a subse-
quent bond posting requirement, despite significant financial contribu-
tions from the Henrico County Improvement Association. 1 18 People's
Pleasure Park Company purchased the land on May 3, 1906 and started
operations a few days later, causing Dick Rohleder more than a little
annoyance.1 19
Rohleder must have found the "incessant" "hurrahing and whoops"
of the black park patrons maddening. 120 He was also deeply bothered by
their presence on streetcars. 1 2 1 This was no small matter in the South.'
2 2
Perhaps because railways are natural monopolies-where efficiency fa-
vors fewer lines and, to an extent, fewer cars, thereby discouraging race-
specific rail transport-integrated railways were carefully managed and
highly contested.1 23 Streetcars were especially contentious and perilous
Harriet J. Powers on October 5, 1904 for $750 and other consideration. See People's
Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 100-01, 106 (deposition of R.A. Rohleder).
114. Id. at 102. Richard Rohleder was a local title examiner. Id. at 99.
115. Id. at 103.
116. Id. at 14-24 (plaintiff's bill for injunctive relief).
117. See id. at 31 (Injunction Order, Apr. 10, 1906).
118. See id. at 31 (Injunction Enlargement Order, Apr. 20, 1906); id. at 31-32
(Injunction Order, June 1, 1906).
119. See id. at 21 (plaintiffs bill for injunctive relief). On Dick Rohleder's annoyance
regarding the streetcars, see id. at 101 (deposition of R.A. Rohleder).
120. See id. at 104 (deposition of R.A. Rohleder).
121. See id. ("Oft times on Sunday it was necessary to stop the cars in order to collect
fares, and to throw these negroes who got on at Fulton Park, off the cars in order that
white persons could have a seat or get a foothold.").
122. See Rabinowitz, supra note 95, at 342 ("'[B]lacks are forced into the smoking
cars where they are subjected not only to all the annoyance of smoke and dirt, but often to
the additional hardship of association with the roughest and most quarrelsome class of
whites.'" (quoting Nashville Am., July 30, 1885)).
123. Many municipalities simply excluded blacks from the streetcars when they were
first introduced. In Richmond, blacks were required to ride on the outside of the cars
while whites rode on the inside. In other places, trolley companies were required to run
multiple cars, each designated for a particular race. There are accounts of cars fitted with
white balls on their roofs to identify them for the sole use of "white women and their
escorts." Rabinowitz, supra note 95, at 330-31. Black entrepreneurs tried, with varying
success, to establish black rail and trolley lines. Juliet E.K. Walker, The History of Black
Business in America: Capitalism, Race, Entrepreneurship 193-96 (1998); August Meier &
Elliott Rudwick, The Boycott Movement Against Jim Crow Streetcars in the South,
1900-1906, 55J. Am. Hist. 756, 765 (1969). Efforts to maintain separate racial rail lines
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places for blacks. 124 MajorJohnson experienced this firsthand when Pri-
vate Elijah Turner, of the Virginia Sixth Negro Regiment under his com-
mand, was shot dead by a streetcar conductor for refusing to move from a
seat reserved for whites. 125
Customers of People's Pleasure Park also experienced streetcar vio-
lence firsthand. Dick Rohleder recalled one occasion where, "fully dis-
gusted and sufficiently amused," he watched "negroes thrown off the
car[s]" to make room for whites: "[T]hey pushed them off, they pulled
them off, they knocked them off, and they threw them off, and doubtless,
had there been any other means of getting them off the officials of the
railroad would have resorted to that also." 126 Yet despite these perils, rid-
ers by the thousands flocked to the black-owned park, rendering huge
profits for the company.127 The profits, it is reasonable to assume, were
at the root of the lawsuit-notwithstanding Dick Rohleder's personal in-
dignation-as the principal actor against People's Pleasure Park, Dick's
brother Joe Rohleder, undoubtedly desired such profits from his own
amusement business and "colored colony."' 28
and cars broke down as trolley companies complained that "separate cars would not pay."
Rabinowitz, supra note 95, at 345 (citing Richmond Planet, Dec. 27, 1890). The costs and
inefficiencies associated with segregated streetcars turned trolley companies into
unexpected allies of Southern blacks (to some extent). Initially "[s]treetcar companies
either ignored [local streetcar segregation laws] or blatantly refused to enforce [them],"
but later they "seemed to have responded to the call for separate sections as an alternative
to running entirely separate cars." Jennifer Roback, The Political Economy of Segregation:
The Case of Segregated Streetcars, 46J. Econ. Hist. 893, 916 (1986).
124. Even more so than on railcars, blacks feared "physical maltreatment at the hands
of 'poor white trash'-[streetcar] conductors and motormen." Meier & Rudwick, supra
note 123, at 761. When conductors were given police powers the threat to blacks increased
substantially. John Mitchell, editor of the black newspaper the Richmond Planet, warned his
readers to avoid conflict with conductors during the black streetcar boycott of 1905:
"[Ylou will see their guns, their Winchesters." Id. at 771 (quoting Richmond Times-
Dispatch, Apr. 20, 1905). Fifty years before the bus boycotts of the Civil Rights movement,
there were streetcar boycotts throughout much of the South. There were even "successful
protests against Jim Crow horsecars during Reconstruction in Richmond, New Orleans,
Charleston, and Louisville." Id. at 758.
125. Gatewood, supra note 1, at 207.
126. People's Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 111 (deposition of RA. Rohleder).
127. Id. at 33 (affidavit of John A. King) (predicting profits of $1500 per month
between May and October). Rohleder claimed that "enormous crowds of negroes
sometimes amounting to eight or ten thousand were . . . turned loose in that
neighborhood to the terror and geat [sic] danger of the white people in that community."
Brief for Appellee at 5, People's Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 61 S.E. 794 (Va. 1908) (No.
135). The Brief noted that the "negro crowds were noisy, rowdy, objectionable,
indecent, ... and were a constant danger and a source of anxiety and annoyance to the
white people in that community, and especially was this so after a white woman was
insulted." Id.
128. Joe Rohleder owned the abutting Shelton Park, where "there [were] 9 houses on
that property occupied by colored people" and none "by white people." People's Pleasure
Park Record, supra note 98, at 63 (deposition of J.W. Gillman); see also id. at 143
(deposition of J.W. Powers). Joe Rohleder also owned "a small store just across the
Southern Railway from [ ] 'Fulton Park.'" Id. at 44 (demurrer and answers of People's
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HeinOnline -- 106 Colum. L. Rev. 2052 2006
2006] INCORPORATING RACE 2053
"A man of violent and vindictive temper,"129 Joe Rohleder had the
"whole management" of People's Pleasure Park arrested on its opening
night.130 Only the week before, he was running his own amusement
fair-selling tobacco and candles, and operating a toboggan slide-at
Fulton Park.131 He also owned and managed Shelton Park, a twenty-acre
residential plot abutting Fulton Park that at the time only accommodated
blacks. 132 This, of course, strained relations with Bliss and Blanche Black,
who were marketing the Fulton Park area as an exclusive white commu-
nity.133 Fulton Park manager David G. Fulton testified that once Shelton
Park opened up to blacks, it became impractical to establish a "white col-
ony" or to operate an amusement park for whites. 134 Still, David Fulton
continued to market lots for several more years while he and Joe
Rohleder maintained a tense working relationship. 3 5 But when rumors
Pleasure Park Co.). J.L. Rohleder was identified as the principal instigator. See id. at 156
(deposition of A.F. Craddock); id. at 160 (deposition of F.P. Watson); id. at 171
(deposition of C.E. Dawson); id. at 177 (deposition of J.D. Clark). J.L. Rohleder also
contributed more to the litigation and bond than anyone else.
Florence seemed an uninterested or even unwilling plaintiff. By several accounts, she
was indifferent to the rumored transaction. See id. at 156 (deposition of A.F. Craddock);
id. at 169-70 (deposition of C.E. Dawson). J.W. Camp also testified "that at the time" Joe
and Florence Rohleder "did not speak." Id. at 225 (deposition of J.W. Camp).
129. Id. at 44 (demurrer and answers of People's Pleasure Park Co.).
130. Local papers suggested that the arrest warrants were sworn out by A.H. Rohleder.
See Fulton Park Managers Arrested, Times-Dispatch (Richmond), May 5, 1906, at 8; Fulton
Park Is Tied Up, News Leader (Richmond), May 9, 1906, at 5; Fulton Park Case Exciting
Interest, Times-Dispatch (Richmond), May 10, 1906, at 12. The deposition of Richard
Rohleder, however, indicates that Joseph Rohleder was behind the criminal arrest
warrants. People's Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 112-13 (deposition of R.A.
Rohleder). According to a local paper, A.H. Rohleder claimed "that he had a verbal
contract with the former owners of Fulton Park, by which he was to manage the place for
the coming season [and that he] was looking forward to the position of manager of the
park for this season." Fulton Park Managers Arrested, supra.
131. He was subsequently arrested for selling tobacco and operating a toboggan slide
at Fulton Park without a license. County Court Order Constables Removed, News Leader
(Richmond), July 17, 1906, at 1; Henrico Citizens Are Enthusiastic, Times-Dispatch
(Richmond),June 4, 1906, at 8; Magistrate Is Accused, News Leader (Richmond),June 14,
1906, at 1; News of the Suburbs: Highland Springs, Times-Dispatch (Richmond), May 6,
1906, at D5; Non-License Case in Henrico Continued, News Leader (Richmond), June 2,
1906, at 4; Squire Angle Is Indignant, News Leader (Richmond), June 15, 1906, at 4.
132. David Fulton unsuccessfully attempted to buy the abutting twenty-acre site
shortly after he purchased Fulton Park. People's Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 217
(deposition of D.C. Fulton). The property was instead acquired by Sol Cutchins, who
named it "Shelton Park." Cutchins conveyed Shelton Park to Joe Rohleder on September
18, 1901. Id. at 150 (Agreed Statement of Facts).
133. Relations were strained to the point where Cutchins was alleged to have
threatened to "start a negro town" in response to David Fulton's recalcitrance. Id. at
206-07 (deposition of D.C. Fulton).
134. See id. at 208 ("[A]fter Shelton Park was opened up to the sale of colored
people . . . it damaged us. . . . We lost money."). Fulton also answered that it was
impracticable to establish a white colony at Fulton Park. Id.
135. Joe Rohleder developed hard feelings when Fulton rejected his request for an
easement across Fulton Park to 9 Mile Road. See id. at 143-44 (deposition of J.W.
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of the sale to the colored corporation surfaced,1 3 6 the simmering conflict
between them reached "blood heat. 1
3 7
FIGURE 1: SHELTON PARK MAP
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That summer, the sale of Fulton Park to People's Pleasure Park Com-
pany consumed Joe Rohleder and other members of the Henrico County
Improvement Association, which was formed in response to the transac-
tion.13 8 Dr. G.T. Collins, the association's president, divulged: "We ate it,
drank it, and slept it."1 39 They also placed ads "calling on citizens . . . to
take action," and they instigated trouble for Major Johnson when and
Powers). Yet despite the difficulties between them, J.L. Rohleder apparently either worked
(or was promised employment) at the amusement park at Fulton Park. See id. at 215
(deposition of D.G. Fulton).
136. It was rumored that there were "colored persons who propose[d] to [create a]
place of amusement for negroes." Id. at 20 (complaint of appellant).
137. Henrico Citizens Banded Together, Times-Dispatch (Richmond), May 8, 1906,
at 3 ("The people are on the warpath .. .and they intend to make things hum for
purchaser and seller in the transaction, which stuck a short pole at less than arm's length
into the unsuspected hornet's nest."); see also Danger of Clash at Fulton Park, News
Leader (Richmond),June 2, 1906, at 9 (predicting "further trouble between the white and
black factions at Fulton Park"); Henrico Pleasure Park Case Argued in Court, Times-
Dispatch (Richmond), Mar. 10, 1907, at 6 ("The residents and property-owners of the Fair
Oaks neighborhood were aligned with the Rohleders in their battle against the negro
pleasure park, and at one time a serious disturbance, involving a clash between the whites
and blacks, seemed imminent."); White People Aroused, Times-Dispatch (Richmond), May
4, 1906, at 6 (describing community as "thoroughly aroused" and "ready to fight the matter
out to the bitter end").
138. See People's Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 4 (complaint for appellant)
("[A] number of persons... living on the line of Seven Pines electric road ... organized
the 'Henrico County Improvement Association' for the purpose of trying to defeat your
corporate petitioner in its effort to establish a pleasure park for colored people on the
property in question.").
139. Id. at 117 (deposition of R.A. Rohleder).
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where they could.' 40 Several "clashes between the Rohleder men and the
negroes" were reported in the press. 1 41 And as tensions rose so did the
membership of the association, 1 42 which would subsequently be repre-
sented (Dr. Collins announced at a packed meeting in the East Rich-
mond Sunday School) by the exiting governor of the state of Virginia.143
The departing governor, Andrew Jackson Montague, had five years
earlier based his gubernatorial campaign on a platform of white
supremacy and disfranchisement of Virginia's blacks. 14 4 He made good
on his campaign promises. Following his inauguration, at the 1902 con-
stitutional convention, he helped fashion a state constitution designed to
limit black political participation through poll taxes and literacy tests. 1 45
In response to concerns that the new constitution would also limit white
voting power, Montague wrote that he and his party's representatives at
the convention were "slowly, but surely, framing a law that will so effectu-
ally exclude the idle, shiftless and illiterate of the negro race from the
suffrage that the gates of republican wrath cannot prevail against it."
1 46
"[W]e will accomplish this," he assured his constituency, "and keep the
pledge that no white man will be disfranchised."' 47 Of course, the subse-
quent disfranchisement of blacks in Virginia and the South generally is
well documented.1 48 And though Governor Montague would ultimately
fail in his effort to convince the court that People's Pleasure Park was
black, his disfranchisement policies were successful and lasting. A cen-
tury after their implementation, municipalities throughout Virginia are
still wrestling with their lingering effects. In the 1970s and 1980s, the City
of Richmond attempted to undermine some of the harmful conse-
quences of political disfranchisement by encouraging black participation
in government contracting. 1 49 Ironically, it has been suggested that the
Supreme Court first recognized (white) corporate racial identity in a
140. Id. at 45, 198.
141. Danger of Clash at Fulton Park, supra note 137. Insurance companies too
refused to insure People's Pleasure Park, given "the great hostility of the white people
along the Seven Pines Electric Railway . ..and the fear [that] hostile persons might
willfully set fire [to the property]." People's Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 33-34
(affidavit of James W. Gordon).
142. Henrico Citizens Bitterly Opposing, Times-Dispatch (Richmond), May 25, 1906,
at 5 ("Seventy-five new names were added to the list of members of the association as a
result of the good work of last night.").
143. Id.; cf. William Larsen, Montague of Virginia: The Making of a Southern
Progressive 248 (1965) [hereinafter Larsen, Montague of Virginia].
144. William Larsen, AndrewJackson Montague: Virginia's First Progressive, in The
Governors of Virginia: 1860-1978, at 159, 162 (Edward Younger &James T. Moore eds.,
1982). He also fought for the elimination of "Negro suffrage" as Attorney General of
Virginia. Id. at 161-62.
145. Id. at 163.
146. Larsen, Montague of Virginia, supra note 143, at 111 (quoting No White Man to
Lose His Vote in Virginia, 1901 Election Broadside).
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Litwack, supra note 93, at 218-29.
149. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-79, 502 n.3 (1989).
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challenge to one of these programs. 150 Before turning to this claim, how-
ever, let us briefly consider the court's ruling in People's Pleasure Park.
C. Regarding and Disregarding (Raceless) Corporate Persons
The Fulton Park lots in question specifically restricted transfer of ti-
de to "persons of African descent" or "colored person or persons." 151
Judge R. Carter Scott of the Circuit Court of Henrico County found this
title restriction repugnant. He voided it as "an unreasonable restraint on
alienation [and] contrary to public policy."1 52 However, he enjoined
People's Pleasure Park's operations on the land until the "[c]ompany or
some one for it [paid Florence Rohleder] the market value of her prop-
erty." 153 The company appealed.
Judge Scott ordered the payment because he felt Florence Rohleder
was misled and "imposed upon in the purchase of her [lot] .-154 At trial,
her counsel argued that the expectation that "colored people" would be
excluded from Fulton Park "was a material inducement to" his client;' 55
and this expectation was reasonable given the numerous newspaper ads,
pamphlets, and personal assurances from Bliss Black and his associ-
ates. 156 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
refused to engraft this parol evidence "on the deed,1 57 and focused its
attention instead on the tide restriction. Without ruling on the repug-
nancy of the restriction, the appeals court reversed Judge Scott, sus-
taining the demurrer filed by People's Pleasure Park claiming that the
150. See Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1058
(9th Cir. 2004) (noting that Supreme Court has "implicitly recognized that corporations
can have racial characteristics by allowing white owned corporations to challenge
contractor set asides on reverse discrimination grounds" (citing JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469); see discussion infra notes 259-273 and accompanying text.
151. Bliss Black conveyed the lots on Fulton Park to various associates, including
Revere Beach Company, before getting to People's Pleasure Park. The deeds in relevant
part stated, "[t]he title to this land never to vest in a person or persons of African descent"
and "[t]he title to this land never to vest in a colored person or persons." People's
Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 61 S.E. 794, 794 (Va. 1908) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
152. See id at 795; People's Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 237 (Final Decree of
Oct. 4th, 1907).
153. See People's Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 237 (Final Decree of Oct. 4th,
1907).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 27 (Exhibit B (trial brief for F.E. Rohleder)).
156. The Blacks aggressively advertised Fulton Park in the Richmond papers. See id.
at 125 (deposition of J. St. George Bryan, Secretary and Treasurer of the Times-Dispatch
(Richmond)); id. at 144-46 (Exhibit ADV. 1 to Exhibit ADV. 6); id. at 146 (Exhibit ADV.
6) ("Fulton Park on Seven Pines Electric, near Fair Oaks, is slowly but surely forging ahead.
Its owners are Boston men who are here to stay, and propose to make it a select suburb
[and] therefore will not sell to colored people." (emphasis added)).
157. People's Pleasure Park, 61 S.E. at 796.
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title was not transferred to colored persons. 158 "The court said, in effect,
that the corporation was not colored, because it 'is a person which exists
in contemplation of law only, and not physically."159
Professor Maurice Wormser admonished the appeals court for its
"slavish adherence" 60 to persona ficta-converting, he argued, a fiction
of convenience into a "fetish" in much the same way "savages worship a
red cow or an ornamental totem pole as a supposed incarnation of a sa-
cred spirit."161 Of course, Wormser was not advocating that the court
ought to have assigned a race to the corporation, thereby expanding the
fiction. He rather believed that the court should have disregarded the
fiction of a veil separating the corporate entity from its owners. 162 It was
he, after all, who popularized the expression "piercing the veil," and he
embraced a liberal standard of holding shareholders liable for corporate
misconduct. 1 63
The difference between piercing the corporate veil (i.e., assigning
corporate liability or status to shareholders) and assigning shareholder
status or characteristics to the corporate entity is worth emphasizing. It is
one thing to disregard the (raceless) corporate person "and hold a share-
holder responsible for the corporation's action as if it were the share-
holder's own." 1 6 4 It is entirely another matter to attribute shareholders'
ascriptive features as if they were the corporation's own. Without con-
cluding that the corporation possessed a racial identity (or not), the
People's Pleasure Park court in either event could have pierced. It was just
not an obvious case for piercing, 65 and much of Wormser's outrage over
the court's denial of corporate racial identity seems simply misplaced.
158. Id. at 797. The court reached this conclusion after quoting various sources in
support of the distinct legal personality of the corporation, including justice Marshall's oft-
cited Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
159. Wormser, Disregard, supra note 5, at 27 (quoting People's Pleasure Park, 61 S.E. at
796).
160. Id. at 2.
161. Id. at 24.
162. "The decision entirely overlooks that the sole purpose of organization of the
corporation was obviously to evade and circumvent the title restriction forbidding negroes
from taking the land. Thefiction should not have been applied." Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
163. Stephen B. Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil §1:5, at 1-26 to 1-30 (1991).
While recognizing the logical mandate preserving the fiction of "distinction between the
corporation, as a legal unit, and its members," Wormser argued that courts should
"shake[ ] aside fiction... in order to dojustice." Wormser, Disregard, supra note 5, at 91,
26; see also I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 Colum. L. Rev.
496, 514 (1912) [hereinafter Wormser, Piercing] (urging that corporate entity theory be
ignored in stockholders' suits for mismanagement).
164. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
Cornell L. Rev. 1036, 1036 (1991).
165. Wormser was simply wrong in claiming that the court overlooked the fact "that
the sole purpose of organization of the corporation was obviously to evade and circumvent
the title restriction forbidding negroes from taking the land." Wormser, Disregard, supra
note 5, at 27. The court record reveals a clear awareness that People's Pleasure Park
Company "was organized for the purpose of acquiring the Fulton Park tract as a place of
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The asserted impossibility of a racially identified corporation was,
however, a curious basis on which to resolve the matter. The covenants
could have been invalidated on a number of conventional grounds. In
addition to being an unreasonable restraint on alienation and against
public policy, the covenants were susceptible to challenge under the
changed circumstances doctrine. 16 6 Despite original intentions, the area
had hardly developed into an exclusively white community. Beyond the
black settlement at neighboring Shelton Park, there was "a public county
school for colored children" on Fulton Park property, a "colored church"
across the street, and various nearby "colored parks." 16 7 The appellate
court neglected all of these issues, instead choosing to focus on the al-
leged race of the corporation. This choice was quite deliberate, as can be
seen by reference to the extant jurisprudence of race and corporate exis-
tence, to which we now turn.
D. The Race Arbitrage Problem
Conceding that corporations possessed racial identities would have,
in a variety of ways, threatened the South's segregationist regime. Pre-
apartheid South Africa faced and averted a similar threat in Dadoo, Ltd. &
Others v. Krugersdorp Municipal Council.168 The case involved Mahomed
Mamojee Dadoo, who held 149 shares of Dadoo, Ltd., with the remaining
share owned by A.E. Dindar. 169 Both Dadoo and Dindar were legally de-
fined as British Indians ("Asiatics") and "coloured." The company,
Dadoo, Ltd., purchased two stands within Krugersdorp Municipality in
1915. One stand was used as a grocery and the other was occupied by
Dadoo and his family when he was in South Africa and by his manager
when he was away. 170 Krugersdorp Municipality contended that though
amusement for colored people." People's Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 3
(petitioner's facts). As for Virginia's veil piercing doctrine, the earliest case I found was
Commonwealth v. Southeastern Iron Corp., 128 S.E. 528 (Va. 1925), which involved
disregarding the separateness of two corporations. Epperson and Canny describe
Virginia's piercing doctrine as "more fluid" and reliant on the "totality of the
circumstances." G. Michael Epperson & Joan M. Canny, The Capital Shareholder's
Ultimate Calamity: Pierced Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of
Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, 37 Cath. U. L. Rev. 605, 626 (1988). Stephen Presser
observed that "Virginia is a fairly mainstream veil-piercing jurisdiction, which follows the
usual two-part analysis, and demands (1) proof of 'alter ego' or 'instrumentality,' and (2)
proof of wrongful use of the corporate form such as fraud or crime." Presser, supra note
163, §2:51, at 2-606 to 2-607. Assuming there was a unity of interests among the
shareholders and People's Pleasure Park Company, evidence of fraud or crime appeared
lacking.
166. See generally Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1841 (1994).
167. See People's Pleasure Park Record, supra note 98, at 63-64 (deposition of J.W.
Gilham) (school and church); id. at 58 (parks); see also id. at 206-07 (deposition of D.G.
Fulton).
168. 1919 (1920) A.D. 530 (A) (S. Mr.).
169. Id. at 539.
170. Id. at 540.
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the stands at issue were registered in the name of Dadoo, Ltd., they were
virtually owned by Mahomed Dadoo in contravention of laws prohibiting
"coloured" and "Asiatic" persons from owning fixed property.' 7 1
In an opinion strikingly similar to People's Pleasure Park, the appellate
court held that "[a] registered company [such as Dadoo, Ltd.] is a legal
persona distinct from the members who compose it;"' t 7 2 and "[as] a mere
legal person" the corporation "has neither body, parts nor passions"' 7 3
and could "in no sense be described as an Asiatic. 1 74 Thus, even though
"Dadoo Ltd., was manifestly formed to acquire what Dadoo personally
could not hold,' 75 the validity of the transaction "follow[ed] from the
separate legal existence with which such corporations are by statute en-
dowed."' 7 6 As the court observed, "had Dadoo and Dindar been part-
ners, they could not legally have become owners of these stands; but as
shareholders in a company which owns them, they remain... outside the
legal prohibition."' 177
In holding for Dadoo, Ltd., the court protected the integrity of cor-
porate transactions as well as the fiction that the license to establish
race-as opposed to simply identifying it-was ultra vires of the court's
domain. The court's decision, however, opened up an extraordinary ar-
bitrage opportunity for corporate and "coloured" persons. By organizing
their activities and transactions through corporate entities, "coloured"
persons could defeat state-mandated racial segregation in a number of
situations. The court was well aware that "[s]uch situations might easily
171. Id. at 531. The relevant statutes were Law No. 3 of 1885 s. 2 (preventing
"Asiatics" from owning immovable or fixed property "except only in such streets, wards or
locations as the Government for purposes of sanitation shall assign them to live in") and
Gold Law of 1908 s. 130 (similarly prohibiting "coloured" persons from acquiring certain
properties). See Dadoo, 1919 (1920) A.D. at 541.
As Asiatics [Dadoo and Dindar] are hit by sec. 2(b) of Law No. 3, 1885, as
amended by Volksraadbesluit of 12th August, 1886, and are not capable of being
owners of immovable property in the Transvaal. As coloured persons within the
meaning of sec. 130(1) of Act 35 of 1908 they may not acquire any rights under
that Act, nor may the holder of any right acquired under any of the previous Gold
Laws transfer or sublet any portion of such right to either of them, nor permit
either of them to reside on or occupy ground held under such right, with the
single exception [of] . . . bona fide servants.
Id. at 563 (De Villiers, J., dissenting). The court was quite candid in its understanding of
the policy behind these statutes: "No doubt these enactments were passed in furtherance
of a policy of social, political and economic inequality as between white and coloured
inhabitants of the Republic." Id. at 549 (majority opinion). "That policy, it is said, was that
the people would not recognize the equality of the white and coloured inhabitants either
in Church or State." Id. at 555 (Solomon, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 550 (majority opinion).
173. Id. at 552.
174. Id. at 557 (Solomon, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 542 (majority opinion).
176. Id. at 550.
177. Id. at 552.
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arise and would present difficulty."' 7 3 The difficulty was largely avoided
with the passage of a law, which "specially declared that from and after
May 1st, 1919, [the racially restrictive statutes] shall be construed as
prohibiting the ownership of fixed property by any company in which
Asiatics possess a controlling interest."1 79
Compared to South Africa, laws mandating racial residential separa-
tion in the United States played a relatively limited role (at least tempo-
rally) in effecting segregation. As such, a rule of statutory interpretation
could not be used to restrain the arbitrage opportunities created by the
People's Pleasure Park decision. The "difficulty" here was avoided by ex-
panding the scope of private race-based covenants to include "use" and
"occupancy" restrictions. Recall that Rohleder argued such restrictions
were implied in her deed, but the court would not admit parol evidence
supporting her claim. These restrictions had to be placed directly into
the covenants and-as the following case illustrates-when properly inte-
grated they effectively discouraged the arbitrage described above.18 0
Twenty years after People's Pleasure Park, in 1926, the property owners
of a Columbus, Ohio neighborhood agreed (through equitable servi-
tudes) that their lots shall not "be leased, rented, sold or conveyed to any
person or persons of any race other than Caucasian, nor shall any such
[persons] be permitted to occupy the same . . .except as a servant.1181
On or around June 6, 1945, one of these lots (lot no. 6 at 93 North Ohio
Avenue) was conveyed to the Monroe Avenue Church of Christ, an Ohio
corporation. The church planned to use the single residence property as
a parsonage for its minister, Reverend Lloyd L. Dickerson.18 2 However,
because the church had a racially mixed congregation and because
Reverend Dickerson was "part Negro," plaintiffs, Fred Perkins et al.,
sought to enjoin the sale and to restrict Dickerson's occupancy.1 83
At trial the plaintiffs prevailed on both the sale and occupancy chal-
lenges. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's holding regard-
ing the first challenge, however, stating that "[i] t ought to be clear that a
corporation as a legal entity can have no racial identity."' 84 The sale re-
178. Id. at 549.
179. Id. at 549-50.
180. The arbitrage transactions were discouraged because blacks could buy properties
covered by racially restrictive covenants using their corporate intermediary, but they could
not use or occupy the properties. In addition to discouraging the arbitrage opportunities,
the use and occupancy restrictions were, in some jurisdictions, a useful response to the
challenge of unreasonable restraint on alienation.
181. Perkins v. Trs. of Monroe Ave. Church of Christ, 70 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1946).
182. See Brief for the Defendants-Appellants at 48 app. A, Perkins, 70 N.E.2d 487 (No.
30931).
183. Id. at 48-49 app. A.
184. Perkins, 70 N.E.2d at 490. The court stated that although the church "has a
mixed congregation[,] [i]t was not a non-Caucasian or a Negro, within contemplation of
law." Id.
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striction therefore did not apply against the incorporated church, but the
occupancy restriction against Dickerson was affirmed. 8 5 On appeal to
the Ohio Supreme Court, Dickerson cleverly argued that as a servant-
agent of the incorporated entity, his occupancy was allowed under the
servant exception of the covenant. 18 6 Distinguishing between household
servants and corporate servants, the state supreme court dismissed
Dickerson's appeal in a per curiam opinion,' 8 7 but the matter was subse-
quently resolved in his favor under the then recently handed down ruling
in Shelley v. Kraemer.1 8
8
Arbitrage between corporate and natural persons was (and still is) a
provocative notion, 189 but it is worth noting that in the racially parti-
tioned and stratified Jim Crow South, incorporated persons did not al-
ways face fewer constraints. Consider, for example, Berea College v.
Kentucky, 190 decidedjust two years after Rohleder. Berea College, founded
in 1855, was a racially integrated private college incorporated in
Kentucky.19 1 A half century after the college's founding, the Kentucky
legislature passed a segregation law aimed specifically at the college-the
so-called Day Law-which disallowed "any [public or private] college,
school or institution where persons of the white and negro races are both
received as pupils."' 92 The Supreme Court denied Berea's claimed right
185. Id. at 492-93.
186. See Restatement of Agency § 2 (1933) (distinguishing independent contractors
from servants).
187. See Perkins v. Trs. of Monroe Ave. Church of Christ, 72 N.E.2d 97, 97 (Ohio
1947) (per curiam), rev'd per curiam, 334 U.S. 813 (1948).
188. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants violates Equal Protection Clause); see also Order of the Supreme Court of Ohio
DatedJune 18, 1948 at *1-*2, Perkins, 72 N.E.2d 97 (No. 30931) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
189. Scholars were once intrigued by the implications of gender arbitrage. See
Dewey, supra note 6, at 657 ("[S]uppose that a number of married women, who, under
common law suffered from disability to contract, had formed a corporation."); Machen,
supra note 6, at 256 (noting discussion of whether corporation could marry). This would
seem a fair use of the corporate form, as business entities were often used to impose upon
married women. For instance, "[t]he common law rules [concerning dower], which
before their abolition in 1930 were intended for competent sustenance of the widow...
were often circumvented by the creation of one-man companies to hold real property
belonging to the husband." Wolff, supra note 6, at 517 (emphasis added). Gender and
race arbitrage involving government benefits for women-owned and minority-owned
corporations suggests present day examples, as do nationality-based arbitrage
opportunities that might arise in the context of wartime restraints, trade sanctions, or
embargoes.
190. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
191. Scott Blakeman, Night Comes to Berea College: The Day Law and the African-
American Reaction, 70 Filson Club Hist. Q. 3, 4 (1996) (describing Berea's early history).
192. 1904 Ky. Acts 181 § 1. The Act was named after Kentucky State Representative
Carl Day, who introduced the bill that would later become the Act. For a discussion ofJim
Crow era Kentucky, Berea, and the Day Law, see Jennifer Roback, Rules v. Discretion:
Berea College v. Kentucky, 20 Int'l J. Group Tensions 47, 51 (1990). Berea College,
importantly, was incorporated under a general incorporation Act that "merely required
20061 061
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to continue its integrationist policy by noting that the state's reserved dis-
cretion in granting corporate charters allowed for amendments, such as
that brought about through the Day Law. 19 3
The Court suggested that it might have reached a different conclu-
sion if Berea College had not been incorporated, 19 4 but it limited its in-
quiry to "the power of a State over its own corporate creatures." 19 5 Had
the college unincorporated itself and continued its business, the natural
persons associated with it would have had a stronger constitutional claim
to voluntary interracial association. Of course, Kentucky prevented vol-
untary association through its antimiscegenation laws, and the state
would certainly have argued that application of the Day Law to natural
persons "was a reasonable exercise of its police power. . . to prevent mis-
cegenation."1 9 6 While we can never know how the Court would have
ruled if faced with an unincorporated Berea College, observe that it "re-
jected exactly [this miscegenation] rationale for interfering with property
rights in Buchanan v. Warely." 19 7 Post-Buchanan, in Richmond v. Deans, it
affirmed a Fourth Circuit decision explicitly invalidating a miscegenation-
based ordinance that prohibited the purchase of property in a neighbor-
hood by anyone who could not marry someone of the majority race in
that neighborhood.1 9 8
Consideration of race arbitrage suggests a puzzle. If treating corpo-
rations as raceless created an arbitrage problem, then how are we to un-
derstand the prior judicial refusal to radicalize corporate entities and
avoid this problem in the first place? The answer to this puzzle is simply
that acknowledging race in legal persons presented more problems for
the regime than denying it. Based on many years of race management,
the Court understood the need for a balanced approach.
the signatures of ten Kentucky citizens and the filing of papers with a county clerk." David
E. Bernstein, Plessy v. Lochner The Berea College Case 4 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law,
Law & Econ. Paper Series, Paper No. 00-13, 1999), available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/
faculty/papers/wpDetail.php?wpID=61 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (citations
omitted). Lacking a specific charter to operate a racially integrated school, Berea College
could not claim any vested right to do so despite the passage of the Day Law. Id. at 19.
193. Berea Coll., 211 U.S. at 54, 57.
194. Id. at 54; see also id. at 58 (stressing that Court need only concern itself with
whether Act could be upheld under power of state over its corporations); id at 66-68
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for going beyond that discussion). The statute
did, in fact, prohibit persons and associations of persons (in addition to corporations)
from operating integrated educational institutions. However, the Court did not directly
address the constitutionality of the constraint on voluntary association by natural persons,
relying exclusively on the narrower reserved discretion argument.
195. Id. at 58 (majority opinion).
196. Bernstein, supra note 192, at 27.
197. Id.
198. 281 U.S. 704 (1930) (mem., per curiam), affg per curiam 87 F.2d 712 (4th Cir.
1930).
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Virginia courts, from their colonial beginnings to the present, have
struggled with categorizing and identifying race;' 99 and while often rely-
ing on anatomical or physiological patterns, 20 0 these courts were hardly
ensnared by a view of race as biologically determined. Race was never
solely contingent on scientific verification or clinical examination; it was
identifiable by common knowledge and through performances. 20 1
Throughout the post-Reconstruction South, in particular, court-identi-
fied race was well understood among many as a fiction. 202 This broad
understanding ironically came about because the implementation of de
jure segregation at the turn of the twentieth century required an articula-
tion of race that revealed its social basis. The People's Pleasure Park court
was undoubtedly aware of this. Yet, despite this awareness-or maybe be-
cause of it-the court was disinclined to attribute race to artificial per-
sons. To do otherwise would undermine creditors' rights and the civil
rights of natural persons (as suggested earlier). But there was also an-
other threat, one that could undermine the fragile stability of race in the
199. See Gross, supra note 35, at 165 (noting Virginia Supreme Court's
determination of race of trial witness); A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff,
Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 Geo.
L.J. 1967, 1975-88 (1989) (discussing changes in Virginia's statutory definition of race);
Gilbert T. Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law, 43 Am. L. Rev. 29, 40 (1909)
(discussing Virginia statute's definition of whiteness).
200. Fatimah L.C. Jackson, Anthropological Measurement: The Mismeasure of
African Americans, 568 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 154, 159-60 (2000) (discussing
anthropological measurement as template for racial identification laws). Influenced by
physical scientific research approaches, advocates sought to identify anatomical and
physiological patterns (e.g., cranial size, hair texture, and nose width) in early racial
categorizations. Id.; see also James E. Bowman, Anthropology: From Bones to the Human
Genome, 568 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 140, 143-44 (2000) (discussing research
into purported link between intelligence, cranial size, and race).
201. See Braman, supra note 78, at 1381 (arguing that Supreme Court has never
understood race in biological terms); Michael A. Elliott, Telling the Difference:
Nineteenth-Century Legal Narratives of Racial Taxonomy, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 611, 633
(1999) (discussing Supreme Court cases that classified Native Americans by their lifestyle);
Gross, supra note 35, at 114-15 (discussing complexity of legal construction of race);
Haney Lopez, White by Law, supra note 35, at 115-16 (arguing that legal construction of
race is complex and multidimensional); Harris, supra note 78, at 1714 (discussing relation
between whiteness and property); Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in the
United States, 112 Yale LJ. 1473, 1476 (2003) (arguing that historically many legal actors
conceived of race as social construction).
202. From both extremes-white supremacists on one end and black social critics on
the other-and in between, the sociolegal construction of race in the late 1800s and early
1900s was widely, if not always explicitly, acknowledged. Sharfstein makes this point by
highlighting, inter alia: (i) complaints among white supremacists who felt that law was
watering down whiteness by not excluding individuals with a drop (or more) of black
blood; and (ii) complaints from the other side that "'[i] t is only a social fiction, indeed,
which makes of a person seven-eighths white a Negro."' Sharfstein, supra note 201, at
1476-77, 1489 (quoting Charles W. Chesnutt, The Future American: A Complete Race-
Amalgamation Likely to Occur, Boston Evening Transcript, Sept. 1, 1900, reprinted in
Charles W. Chesnutt: Essays and Speeches 131, 134 (Joseph R. McElrath, Jr. et al. eds.,
1999)).
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South by completely dissociating it from persons. Part IV develops this
claim.
IV. RACE BEYOND PERSONS
Many pages have been devoted to "the tempting but profitless discus-
sion-more metaphysical than legal-as to the true anatomy of the cor-
porate concept. '20 3 For present purposes, a full review of this literature is
unnecessary. 20 4 For while scholars have advanced competing views of
corporate existence (among them, corporations as simple aggregations of
shareholders, 20 5 and as "real persons"), the fiction theory, i.e., persona
ficta, remains unrivaled in common law courts. 20 6 American courts, at
least since Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, have regarded corpo-
rations as artificial persons, mere legal fictions created and expanded for
and at the convenience of law.
2 0 7
A. Legal and Extralegal Objects
Quite apart from legal fictions, people speak naturally of corpora-
tions "as though they are persons."20 8 Language allows corporations to
engage in cognition and other mental states-fictions, to be sure, yet
ones that are not at odds with everyday usage. But when lay persons
make physiological allusions to corporations, their comments often re-
quire metaphoric or metonymic interpretations to make sense. 20 9 Judges
203. Wormser, Piercing, supra note 163, at 496. Recollections of this discussion
undoubtedly informed H.L.A. Hart's plea for legal scholars to abandon their "ever-
baffling" inquiries into the nature of organized associations. H.L.A. Hart, Definitions and
Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 Law Q. Rev. 37, 56 (1954).
204. For an outstanding review of writings up to 1930, see generally Hallis, supra note
6 (commenting on ideas of, inter alia, F.C. von Savigny, A.V. Dicey, Rudolk Stammler, H.
Kelsen, Bernard Bosanquet, Leon Duguit, Otto von Gierke, Rudolf von Ihering, N.M.
Korkunov, GeorgJellink, and H. Krabbe); cf. id. at 247-50 (bibliography).
205. Under the aggregation framework, a corporation, C, is defined by its
shareholders, perhaps uniquely: C - [sl, s3, s3,... s] (such that the corporation may no
longer exist if a shareholder, say si, transfers her interest to another, say to s,,,, or
otherwise ceases to be associated with C0, i.e., C # [s2, s3, s4,... s,, ] and C1,1 # [s2, s3,
s,,.., s,]).
206. See Machen, supra note 6, at 253-55, 257 (noting that debate was richer in
continental Europe that in common law countries). Here shareholders give rise to-and
are members or elements of-a corporation (sl, s2, s3,...s. E C1), but they do not define it,
[si, s, s3,...s.] # C1, and their individual characteristics are independent of the
corporation's.
207. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 667 (1819)
(Story, J., concurring) (describing corporation as "an artificial person, existing in
contemplation of law, and endowed with certain powers and franchises . . . subsisting in
the corporation itself, as distinctly as if it were a real personage" (emphasis added)).
208. Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal
Fiction, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 564, 595 (1987) ("The law did not invent the linguistic imagery of
the corporation as a person.").
209. See id. at 607 ("So far as language is concerned, institutions do not have
bodies-they indeed are incorporeal and intangible-but they certainly do have minds.").
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too, while articulating complex, if not absurd, mental states of corpora-
tions,2 10 have been reluctant to employ the fiction of constructive physi-
cal presence. 2 11 And though a fewjurists have been willing to imbue the
corporation with physical characteristics, most have resisted this im-
pulse.2 12 And as for expanding the corporate person fiction to include
race, that has been, until very recently it seems, inconvenient for law.
The nature of this inconvenience is not obvious. Given that corpora-
tions are acknowledged "persons," and that persons possess racial charac-
ter, the notion, for instance, of a "black corporation" should be fairly
accessible. Much of the difficulty arises not because of the traps of ana-
logical reasoning, but because of the ambiguity of terms like "persons"
and "black." When these terms are unambiguated, otherwise bizarre dec-
larations often become clear.2 13 Thus at one time in this country it was
perfectly sensible to say that men and women born of African ancestry
were not (legal) persons, while artificial corporate entities were (legal)
persons.2 14 Today, it may be no more odd to say that natural persons
born of African ancestry are not black, but corporate entities are (legally)
black.
210. For example, some courts employ the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to
shield corporations from conspiracy charges based on the theory that the corporation as a
single person cannot satisfy the plurality requirement of conspiracy (even though multiple
agents of the corporation may clearly engage in conspiratorial acts on behalf of the entity).
See McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1036 (lth Cir. 2000)
(describing intracorporate conspiracy doctrine and citing various cases that have employed
it).
211. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
Colum. L. Rev. 809, 812 (1935) ("The jurisdiction taken of foreign corporations ... does
not rest upon a fiction of constructive presence .... "(quoting Bank of Am. v. Whitney
Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 173 (1923))).
212. See Wolff's discussion regardingJohn of Salisbury's theory of the corporate state,
which Wolff characterized as "grotesque" and without real meaning. Wolff, supra note 6,
at 498. Salisbury "designated the prince as the head, the senate as the heart .... judges as
the ears, eyes and tongue .... the Treasury and the tax collectors ... [as] intestines and
belly," and so on. Id. Similarly, Lord Denning's remark in an oft-cited comment that "[a]
company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and a nerve
centre .... hands which holds the tools. . . ,mind and will .. " H.L. Bolton (Eng'g) Co.
v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd., (1957) 1 Q.B. 159, 172 (C.A.), quoted in Hallis, supra note 6,
at iii-iv. The state, noted Frederick Hallis, is the "powerful creator of such persons.
But .... if the state is not bound by any legal restrictions, it is necessarily bound by the
inherent limitations of the artificial beings which it creates." Hallis, supra note 6, at 80.
Hallis cautioned that when the state goes too far in imbuing into its creations those
qualities enjoyed by natural persons, "it errs in theory and invites practical absurdities." Id.
213. See Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 Colum. L.
Rev. 643, 651 (1932) (discussing "wholly incalculable" number of interrelationships
between legal powers and physical powers and arguing that confusion can be avoided by
"taking into account the concrete individual persons who are related").
214. Blacks were denied the right to be considered persons capable of possessing
citizenship for diversity jurisdiction and other constitutional privileges. Dred Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Many of these were precisely the privileges that
corporations gained upon achieving "personhood."
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Within law, race and personhood operate principally as legal con-
structs, separate and distinct from their meanings outside of law. Extra-
legal meanings, while often sharing similar or overlapping origins with
legal characterizations, and while frequently drawn upon to support legal
reasoning, are neither isomorphic with nor necessarily constitutive of le-
gal definitions.21 5 It is interesting to observe, but it ought not be surpris-
ing, that as extralegal understandings of racial and corporate formation
depart from their shared origins with law, legal understandings of these
notions can appear stubbornly fixed. Though they may increasingly take
on the quality of being absurd fictions, they need not be abandoned be-
cause they were never intended to be consonant with notions outside of
law or subject to their external validation. 216 Hence, to a lawyer it should
be uncontroversial that a corporation can be legally a "black person,"
even though economists have forcefully denied the existence of a corpo-
rate personhood 2 l7-maintaining instead that the corporation is simply a
nexus of contractual relationships-and anthropologists, geneticists, and
other physical scientists have rejected the existence of natural racial
groupings. 21 8
In some cases, we seem able to simultaneously hold distinct biologi-
cal, cultural, social, and legal understandings of particular constructs.
Take the notion of adulthood. One is biologically an adult when able to
sexually reproduce, which does not necessarily coincide with various cul-
tural criteria (as exemplified in rites of passages such as the Bar Mitzvah)
or broad social understandings of adulthood (e.g., mature independent
living). And none of these prior meanings need coincide with the legal
definition of adulthood. Legal adulthood is simply what law says it is-
and nothing more. It does not, of necessity, change one's adult status
biologically, culturally, or socially; nor does the attainment of adulthood
according to any of those other criteria by itself change one's legal adult
status. Furthermore, it does not matter that one state has a legal age of
215. See Hohfeld, supra note 61, at 20 (asserting importance of "differentiating
purely legal relations from the physical and mental facts that call such relations into
being").
216. "Much of the difficulty, as regards legal terminology, arises from the fact that
many of our words were originally applicable to only physical things; so that their use in
connection with legal relations is, strictly speaking, figurative or fictional." Id. at 24
(footnote omitted); see also Dewey, supra note 6, at 657 ("[M]uch of the difficulty
attending the recent discussion of the real personality of corporate bodies is due to going
outside the strictly legal sphere, until legal issues have got complicated with other
theories. .. ").
217. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 59, at 311 (emphasizing "the essential
contractual nature of the firms" and describing "the personalization of the firm" as
"seriously misleading").
218. For a broad survey on the existence of race as a biological construct within the
anthropological and scientific communities, see generally Braman, supra note 78, at
1411-18, 1423-36 (describing influence of anthropologist Franz Boas during first half of
twentieth century as well as more recent developments).
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adulthood that is different from another state. Law's explicit indepen-
dent operation is fairly transparent when it comes to adulthood.
Race is another matter. Race exhibits a greater tolerance for ambi-
guity. The sources of race are less subject to being isolated-or perhaps
the difference is that with race we demand greater coherence across do-
mains (biological, cultural, social, and legal), as well as greater coherence
within law, making it difficult to observe law's independent force. This
demand for coherence is driven by strong suspicions concerning legal
racial classifications. Because of these suspicions, extralegal notions of
race are constantly and fluidly enlisted by lawmakers as part of theirjustif-
icatory rhetoric. Legal "adulthood" requires less by way of justification,
because asJohn Hart Ely has observed, "the [fact] that all of us once were
young.., should neutralize whatever suspicion we might otherwise enter-
tain respecting the multitude of laws (enacted by predominantly middle-
aged legislatures) that comparatively advantage . . . those who are
younger. '2 1 9 Racial determinations and laws disadvantaging members of
specified races can hardly be afforded such deference given our history.
Centuries of de jure subjugation of minority races required support
beyond law. This was particularly important in the Jim Crow South be-
cause highlighting law's independent production of racial character
would undermine the segregationist imperative of that place and time. It
is much harder to maintain that blacks are naturally inferior to whites,
and therefore subject to white control, if blacks are not naturally black,
but instead made so by law. Thejustificatory prerequisite for law to regu-
late and subordinate classes of persons-black persons, corporate per-
sons, other persons-is predicated on a conception and characterization
of their prelegal personhood allowing for, or even requiring, heightened
regulation. The imagined natural inferiority of blacks authorized their
subordination, 220 just as the image of lifeless enterprises being granted
existence through legislative charters justified the state's regulation of
corporate persons. 22 1 Revealingly, beginning in the late 1800s, as law's
explicit role in producing "colored" and corporate persons became more
219. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory ofJudicial Review 160 (1980).
220. As ChiefJustice Taney maintained, while arguing that blacks were not entitled to
the privileges of citizenship under the U.S. Constitution:
[Blacks] had for more than a century before [the framing of the Constitution]
been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate
with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). Therefore, blacks were subject
to continued subjugation because of their inferior prelegal (preconstitutional) nature as
viewed from the perspective of the Framers, if not from the perspective of the opinion's
author.
221. This idea is commonly referred to as the "grant" or "concession" theory, "which
treated the act of incorporation as a special privilege conferred by the state." Horwitz,
supra note 85, at 181. From this act a number of legal doctrines were derived "in order to
enforce the state's interest in limiting and confining corporate power." Id; see also
Bratton, supra note 85, at 433.
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formal and explicit, it had the effect of delegitimizing the extantjustifica-
tions of their subordination. 222 Racial definitions in law may thus not
only tolerate ambiguity, they might actually require it.223
B. The Trouble with Race
Scholars have long recognized and discussed the confounded nature
of race. Though current academic discourse largely acknowledges race as
a social product, 224 not all researchers are willing to abandon more tradi-
222. The post-Reconstruction South sought to formalize what had long been
customary and informal. Thus, even more so than in the context of slavery, segregation
required clear legal classifications of the races. As Gilbert T. Stephenson observed, "[i]f
race distinctions are to be recognized in the law, it is essential that the races be
distinguished from one another." Stephenson, supra note 199, at 37. The institutional
change (from slavery to segregation) that called for formalist attempts at classifying race
resulted in many inconsistencies and contradictions (both between and within
jurisdictions), which fueled challenges to the regulation of "colored" persons. See, e.g.,
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott revealed how
his conception of black personhood led to a denial of the constitutional privileges of
citizenship to blacks. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05. Similarly, Justice Taney's
opinion in Bank of Augusta v. Earle shows how his conception of corporate personhood
informed the view that corporations were also not entitled to the privileges of citizens. 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839). The opinion makes clear that "[h]e could not yet even
imagine that the fictional entity itself could plausibly claim constitutional privileges."
Horwitz, supra note 85, at 185. The justification of corporate regulation would shortly
thereafter suffer a meaningful blow because of formalist changes in the treatment of these
persons. General (or "free") incorporation statutes, reducing corporate formation to mere
formalities, reinforced the notion that the constitutive aspect of this business form was
largely premised on private agreements among private individuals. "[F] ree incorporation
undermined the grant theory." Id. at 181. It did so "[bly rendering the corporate form
normal and regular." Id. at 183. With this, the genesis of corporations was increasingly
viewed as being in the hands of these private individuals and not the state. As such,
arguments justifying state regulation of these entities were weakened, and for a time,
corporations were to a significant extent regulated like partnerships. Id. at 182.
223. "[T]he contradictions deep within the articulation of race actually make it a
stronger concept." Elliott, supra note 201, at 633.
224. See K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, in
Color Conscious 30, 41 (K. Anthony Appiah & Amy Gutmann eds., 1996) [hereinafter
Appiah, Misunderstood] (noting that throughout nineteenth century, race developed
social meaning underpinned by its perceived basis as scientific term); Luigi Luca Cavalli-
Sforza, Race Differences: Genetic Evidence, in Plain Talk About the Human Genome
Project 51, 53 (1997) (discussing how variations in genes are so numerous as to suggest
that it is nearly impossible to define races in scientific way); Haney Lopez, White by Law,
supra note 35, at 111 ("Races are social products."); see also Braman, supra note 78, at
1381 (arguing that Supreme Court has treated race as product of social and political
institutions); Elliott, supra note 201, at 613-15 (arguing that nineteenth century ideas of
race were continually reinvented); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-
Blind," 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1991) (describing one idea of race being formal racial
categories that are socially constructed); Gross, supra note 35, at 114-15 (claiming that
meaning of race is "historically contingent, dependent on political and social
circumstances"); Harris, supra note 78, at 1713 (claiming that whiteness provides valuable
social benefits such that American property law recognizes property interest in whiteness);
cf. Vincent Sarich & Frank Miele, Race: The Reality of Human Differences 2-3 (2004)
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tional views;2 25 nor is the general public. We are all intimate with the
human body, a fact that allows anachronistic views, once connected to the
(noting desire of people in social sciences to downgrade race from biological concept to
mere social construction); Joanna L. Mountain & Neil Risch, Assessing Genetic
Contributions to Phenotypic Differences Among 'Racial' and 'Ethnic' Groups, 36 Nature
Genetics S48, S48 (2004) (analyzing race and ethnicity as social categories, despite some
biological inclusion criteria).
225. On the one hand, many researchers are increasingly concluding that race
(biological or not) has limited analytical value, compared to, for instance, ethnicity, place
of birth, and culture. Editors of some scientific journals have recently rejected racial
categorizations in terms of black and white; "[f]or example, a category of 'a black Chicago
population' would be" too imprecise to allow replication of the study for the purposes of
scientific validity. Bowman, supra note 200, at 141. The American Anthropological
Association has declared the concept of race distortionary and has recommended that "the
term be dropped from the census and scholarly writings." Jennifer Hochschild, From
Nominal to Ordinal: Reconceiving Racial and Ethnic Hierarchy in the United States 31
(2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (citing Am.
Anthropological Ass'n 1996, 2000). The International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors similarly holds in its editorial policy statement that "'authors should avoid terms
such as "race," which lack precise biological meaning, and use alternative descriptors such
as "ethnicity" or "ethnic group" instead.'" Id. at 31-32 (citing Int'l Comm. of Med.Journal
Editors 2001). On the other hand, the American Sociological Association's policy
statement on race maintains that "although racial categories do not necessarily reflect
biological or genetic categories" a decision to "end the collection of data using racial
categories [would be] ill advised." Am. Sociological Ass'n, The Importance of Collecting
Data and Doing Social Scientific Research on Race (2003), at http://www2.asanet.org/
media/asaracestatement.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Many social
scientists are concerned that real inequalities that correlate with existing racial categories
would become unobservable if entities like the U.S. government did not collect statistics on
race. Bowman, supra note 200, at 143 (arguing that government collection of data on race
enhances literature and statistics on voting patterns and incidence of disease). Similar
debate rages within the epidemiological and medical communities regarding the
collection and use of racial data. See Esteban Gonzdlez Burchard et al., The Importance of
Race and Ethnic Background in Biomedical Research and Clinical Practice, 348 New Eng.
J. Med. 1170, 1174 (2003) ("Ignoring racial and ethnic differences in medicine and
biomedical research will not make them disappear. Rather than ignoring these
differences, scientists should continue to use them as starting points for further
research."); Richard S. Cooper et al., Race and Genomics, 348 New Eng.J. Med. 1166, 1167
(2003) ("One view holds that the ability to categorize persons according to continental
,race' validates the clinical and epidemiologic use of self-reported racial ancestry .... We
disagree."); S.O.Y. Keita et al., Conceptualizing Human Variation, 36 Nature Genetics S17,
S19 (2004) ("'Race' is a legitimate taxonomic concept that works for chimpanzees but
does not apply to humans (at this time)."); Mountain & Risch, supra note 224, at S52
("Racial or ethnic categorization will continue to be useful as long as such categorization
'explains' variation unexplained by other factors."); Charles N. Rotimi, Are Medical and
Nonmedical Uses of Large-Scale Genomic Markers Conflating Genetics and 'Race'?, 36
Nature Genetics S43, S46 (2004) ("Unfortunately, instant notoriety can be attained by
reporting genetic explanations for 'racial' differences in disease .... "); Robert S. Schwartz,
Racial Profiling in Medical Research, 344 New Eng.J. Med. 1392, 1392 (2001) ("I maintain
that attributing differences in a biologic end point to race is not only imprecise but also of
no proven value in treating an individual patient.").
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body, to retain a familiar and natural persistence. 22 6 Hence, though the
Court long ago rejected evidence of pigmentation as a proxy for race, 227
the Justices still talk of race in terms of skin color and blood;2 28 even
scholars who argue that race is socially constructed tend to present evi-
dence of construction at the margins of race, leaving untouched the no-
tion that, at its core, race is essentially nonsocial.
The intrigue of corporate racial identity is that it strikes the tradi-
tional notion of race at its core. To see this, let us first consider Judith
Butler's provocative challenge to sex as a presocial biological phenome-
non.22 9 In her boldest moments, Butler appears to contest the very mate-
riality of sexed bodies, 23 0 though she ultimately settles on the more mod-
est (but nonetheless controversial) claim that social practice outlines the
materialization of sex. Butler shifts, as Kenji Yoshino observes, "from an
ontological claim ('There is no biological sex') to an epistemological one
('There may be a biological sex, but we can never be confident that what
we are pointing to is biological sex'). "231 Not knowing where sex ends
and gender begins, any line drawing between biological sex and sociality-
determined gender must be arbitrary, which reveals both the social con-
226. See Braman, supra note 78, at 1458 n.358 ("Many of our strongest institutions
are grounded in analogies to... the body. . ., effectively putting them beyond daily critical
inquiry.").
227. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922) ("Manifestly the test
afforded by the mere color of the skin of each individual is impracticable, as that differs
greatly among persons of the same race . . ").
228. Cases as recent as Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003), explicitly equate
skin color with race. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), Scalia's comments focused on
blood-that is, biological lines of descent-in oral argument. Gotanda, supra note 224, at
32. Some emphasize the courts' approach to race as biologically informed. Id. at 29; Ian
F. Haney Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 Cal.
L. Rev. 1143, 1162 (1997). Others emphasize that courts have not embraced a purely
biological notion of race in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Elliott, supra note
201, at 615 ("[S]ome in the 19th century recognized this process as surely as we do
today."); Gotanda, supra note 224, at 29-30 (discussing Saint Francis College v. Khazraji,
481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4, 613 (1987)).
229. See Butler, Trouble, supra note 35, at 10 ("[T]he sex/gender distinction
suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed
genders.").
230. Butler writes:
And what is "sex" anyway? Is it natural, anatomical, chromosomal, or hormonal,
and how is a feminist critic to assess the scientific discourses which purport to
establish such "facts" for us? . . . If the immutable character of sex is contested,
perhaps this construct called "sex" is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed,
perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction
between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all.
Id. at 10-11.
231. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale LJ. 769, 870-71 (2002).
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struction of sex at the margins23 2 and society's endogenous influence
over the materialized biology of sex.
23 3
Butler's epistemological and endogeneity challenges to biological
sex can also be asserted against biological conceptions of race. Observers
have long noticed the construction of race at the borderline-the so-
called color line-between white and nonwhite ("colored"). 234 Not
knowing where whiteness ends and color begins, the establishment of a
color line reveals the social construction of race at the margins. More-
over, the color line exerts an endogenous effect on "natural" racial fea-
tures, which further contributes to the materialized biology of race as
popularly understood. The biological realizations (such as skin color,
hair texture, and facial features) all too often associated with race are
themselves determined by racial definitions, but again mainly at the
margins.2 35
C. From the Margin to the Core
Notice that both the epistemological and endogeneity challenges,
however, preserve an essentialist understanding of race: We simply can-
not identify it, and through our ignorance, we distort it. Nonetheless, it
232. In Bodies That Matter, Judith Butler writes:
The moderate critic might concede that some part of "sex" is constructed, but
some other is certainly not, and . . . find . . . herself not only under some
obligation to draw the line between what is and is not constructed, but to explain
how... "sex" comes in parts whose differentiation is not a... construction.
Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter 11 (1993) [hereinafter Butler, Bodies].
233. See id. ("But as that line of demarcation between ostensible parts gets drawn, the
unconstructed' becomes bounded once again through a signifying practice, and the very
boundary which is meant to protect some part of sex from the taint of constructivism is
now defined by the anti-constructivist's own construction.").
234. See sources cited supra notes 224-225. Appiah cites an 1876 essay by Ralph
Waldo Emerson: "The individuals at the extremes of divergence in one race of men are as
unlike as the wolf and the lapdog. Yet each variety shades down imperceptibly into the
next, and you cannot draw the line where a race begins or ends." Appiah, Misunderstood,
supra note 224, at 68. As W.E.B. Du Bois famously stated, "[t]he problem of the twentieth
century is the problem of the color-line." W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk 16 (First
Vintage Books 1990) (1903).
235. Many racial constructivists tend to overlook how race affects the materiality of
bodies because for them race has no biological antecedents. Still, race as popularly
conceived does have biological associations, which are influenced by racial demarcations.
Generations of blacks attempting to lighten their skins and straighten their hair with
chemicals or careful mating will attest to this fact. For instance, K. Anthony Appiah, in
support of his argument for the social construction of race, points to the social, behavioral,
and psychological effects of racial labels, but stops short of mentioning physiological
effects. Nonetheless, Appiah's thoughtful analysis is fully consistent with this simple
extension of Butler's claims. To further support his analysis, Appiah enlists Ian Hacking's
notion of dynamic nominalism, which argues that "'numerous kinds of human beings and
human acts come into being hand in hand with our invention of the categories labeling
them."' Appiah, Misunderstood, supra note 224, at 78 (quoting Ian Hacking, Making Up
People, in Forms of Desires: Sexual Orientation and the Social Constructivist Controversy
87 (Edward Stein ed., 1990)).
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remains essentially presocial and is always present. But while one may
have to concede a material essence to sex,2 3 6 it is not clear that a similar
concession must be made with regard to race. Corporate racial identity
resists this concession, allowing one to assert the stronger ontological
claim that there is no biological race, that race is socially constructed at
its core. 23 7 This follows from the fact that corporate persons are artificial
persons, and if there are races among corporations, then those races
must also be artificial. This much is clear. A corporation can be black or
possess some other race only if its race is a social product.
Without a conception of race as fully socially determined, no court
could conceive of such a thing as a "colored corporation." A critic, of
course, might argue that a court-for example, the court in Thinket-
may find race in corporations, but only as derived from the racial essence
of affiliated natural persons, like shareholders, agents, or customers. So
while race in a corporation may be as artificial as the corporate person
itself, the attribution of race to the entity merely extends the bounds of
race beyond natural persons; it does not create it from whole cloth.
Though it is not an inconsequential contribution to show that corporate
racial identity extends the boundaries of race beyond bodies, courts have
actually done more. In Bains, the court attributed race to the corporate
entity based on the conduct of third parties, not their racial essence. The
conduct itself was based on manifestations of attributes associated with
certain ethnicities, religions, and nationalities. There was no necessary
racial essence driving the court's finding of race in the entity. The
court's judgment relied on how race was signaled and received in the
interaction between the plaintiff and the defendant, and not on whether
the entity or any other person possessed some essential racial content.
But when courts condition their attribution of race to a corporate
person on their own judgment (or the state's judgment) of the race of
the corporation's shareholders, they again veer down the dead end path
of searching for racial essence. The alleged racial discrimination against
Thinket by Sun Microsystems did not result from any essential racial char-
acteristic residing in these legal persons, or even in their shareholders
and agents. Thinket's agents simply manifested certain attributes com-
monly associated with race, to which Sun's agents improperly responded
against the corporation. Hence the corporation suffered race-based dis-
crimination. But in this discriminatory interaction there was no essential
racial attribute, no singularly defining essence of race, only manifesta-
tions that signal racial identity. These signals matter legally not because
law has any independent interest in defining or identifying race, but only
236. Butler, Bodies, supra note 232, at 10 ("To 'concede' the undeniability of 'sex' or
its 'materiality' is always to concede some version of 'sex' . . . and, yes, that concession
invariably does occur. .. ").
237. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 45 (Walter Kaufmann trans.,
Vintage Books 1989) (1887) ("[T]here is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming;
'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed-the deed is everything.").
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because the signals are associated with actions that confer gains and pen-
alties. When these gains and penalties are distributed unjustly or in con-
travention of the law, then and only then are they legally relevant.
Legal recognition of racial discrimination against corporations has
the marvelous potential of helping us to see race as it truly is: existing
within an interaction between a signifier and a recipient at a particular
time, in a particular place. This was the ultimate point of the discussion
in Part II. Legal identification of race in corporations need only refer to
how race is signaled and received in an interaction, not to whether a
corporation or any other person has a race. By stressing that their judg-
ments about race are judgments about interactions, about how someone
(or something) was behaving (or being treated) and simultaneously be-
ing interpreted, courts can reflect race not as an essential characteristic of
persons (or things), but as social characteristics of interactions in particu-
lar contexts.
V. LAw OF CORPORATE RACIAL IDENTITY
The U.S. Supreme Court has only twice addressed the possibility of
corporate racial identity, denying it in both instances. 2 38 In Connecticut
General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, Justice Black made a passing refer-
ence-that "[c]orporations have neither race nor color"-in rejecting
the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to strictly legal per-
sons.239 The Court more explicitly dealt with corporate race in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.240 Evaluating
whether the Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC) had
standing to pursue the claim, Justice Powell stated that "[a]s a corpora-
tion, MHDC has no racial identity and cannot be the direct target of the
petitioners' alleged discrimination." 24 1 This is the clearest statement of
"the Supreme Court's view on the narrow issue of whether a corporation
can itself be considered to have a racial character." 242
One year after the Arlington Heights decision, in the summer of 1978,
Hudson Valley Freedom Theater, Inc. (HVFT) sought federal funding to
238. A recent missed opportunity to address the issue was presented in Domino's
Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 126 S. Ct. 1246 (2006). John McDonald, the sole (black)
shareholder of JWM Investments, Inc. (JWM), brought a § 1981 claim against Domino's
Pizza, Inc. (Domino's), alleging that Domino's breached its contracts with JWM because of
racial animus, causing harm to McDonald and his corporation, JWM. However, "[s]ince
JWM settled its claims and [was] not involved in this case, [the Court found] no occasion
to determine whether, as a corporation, it could have brought suit under § 1981." Id. at
1248 n.1. Justice Scalia did note "that the Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue
have concluded that corporations may raise § 1981 claims." Id. (citing Hudson Valley
Freedom Theatre, Inc. v. Heimbach, 671 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459
U.S. 857 (1982)).
239. 303 U.S. 77, 87 (1938) (BlackJ., dissenting).
240. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
241. Id. at 263.
242. Heimbach, 671 F.2d at 707 (PierceJ., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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promote theatrical and artistic productions in minority communities, but
was denied by the local administering agency. HVFT sued in Hudson Val-
ley Freedom Theater, Inc. v. Heimbach, alleging that "it 'personally has suf-
fered [injury] . . .as a result of the putatively illegal [racially motivated]
conduct.' ,,243 Relying on Justice Powell's comments in Arlington Heights,
the lower court ruled "that 'a corporation, as a faceless creature of the
state, may not assert claims of racial discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment on its own behalf.' "244 Reversing this judgment on appeal,
Judge Friendly remarked that Justice Powell's dicta concerning race of
corporations "was of only academic importance" and that he did not be-
lieve "the Supreme Court would slavishly apply it so as to deny HIVFT its
day in court."245
According to the Ninth Circuit opinion in Thinket, Judge Friendly's
belief was vindicated ("at least moderately"24 6) in City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co., 247 where "the Supreme Court ... implicitly recognized that
corporations can have racial characteristics by allowing white owned cor-
porations to challenge contractor set asides on reverse discrimination
grounds."248 Given Justice Powell's dicta in Arlington Heights, there was
indeed surprisingly little discussion of race and standing with regard to
the Croson Company, an Ohio corporation. 249 Still, the absence of this
discussion does not imply (as Thinket claims) that the Court acknowl-
edged Croson as a white corporation. The Court has for some time rec-
ognized that "a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for
§ 1981 protection."250
An alternative, and more plausible, interpretation of Croson's stand-
ing is that of a representative: a reverse derivative action, of sorts, where
the corporation sued on behalf of its (white) shareholders. 25 1 "The prin-
243. Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
244. Id. at 704 (majority opinion) (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 263).
245. Id.; see also Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 14 (lst Cir. 1979)
("[O]ne need not be a member of the racial class protected by the statute and one need
not even be able to identify any specific member of the class who suffered or may suffer
discrimination.").
246. Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
247. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
248. Thinket, 368 F.3d at 1058 (citation omitted).
249. The only direct reference to Croson's standing seems to have been limited to the
amicus brief of the Washington Legal Foundation and the Lincoln Institute for Research
and Education, which simply noted that "[e]ven though Croson is an Ohio Corporation, it
is well-settled that a corporation is a 'person' under the Equal Protection Clause as well as
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 187 Landmark Briefs and
Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 1988 Term
Supplement 469 n.1 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1990).
250. Saint Francis Coll. v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987).
251. With regard to achieving standing through the ordinary derivative action: In
general, shareholders lack standing to assert an individual § 1983 claim based on harm to
the corporation in which they own shares. See RKVentures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d
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ciple that a corporation may assert equal protection claims when it alleges
discrimination because of the color of its stockholders derives implicit
support from Fullilove v. Klutznick .... ,,252 In fact, the Court has estab-
lished a well-settled pattern of allowing racial discrimination representa-
tive suits (by individuals, associations, and corporations) when there ex-
ists an integral legal relationship, 25 3 or when the harmed parties' racial or
ethnic identities are essentially linked to the representative.2 5 4 For exam-
ple, in Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of
America v. City ofJacksonville the Court held that the association had stand-
ing to bring an equal protection claim because its members were disad-
vantaged by Jacksonville's racial classification plan for awarding city con-
tracts. 2 55 Corporations too have been privileged with associational (or
organizational) standing based on shareholders' race. 25 6
Racial antidiscrimination "law prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race-something that it can do without knowing what race is and in-
1045, 1057 (9th Cir. 2002); Erlich v. Glasner, 418 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1969).
Furthermore, unless the corporation's board resists pursuing the discrimination claim
itself, the shareholder faces significant hurdles based on basic corporate law principles.
252. Hudson Valley Freedom Theater, Inc. v. Heimbach, 671 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir.
1982).
253. The relationship between a trustee and the trust beneficiary, for example, may
provide "adequate 'identification' with the allegedly disfavored groups to support an equal
protection claim." Lanna Overseas Shipping, Inc. v. City of Chi., No. 96 C 3373, 1997 WL
587662, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1997); see also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-58
(1953) (finding contractual agreement sufficient for standing).
254. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (allowing NAACP
standing to litigate on behalf of its members' First Amendment associational rights by
noting that NAACP "and its members are in every practical sense identical"). Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit allowed a plaintiff to maintain a § 1983 action in light of state actors' anti-
Semitic behavior based on its "identification with a particular (presumably historically
disadvantaged) group." Sherwin Manor Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McAuliffe, 37 F.3d 1216, 1220
(7th Cir. 1994).
255. 508 U.S. 656, 668-69 (1993); see also United Food & Commercial Workers v.
Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996) ("' [R]epresentational standing,' of which...
Iassociational standing' is only one strand, rests on the premise that in certain
circumstances, particular relationships . . . are sufficient to rebut the background
presumption . . .that litigants may not assert the rights of absent third parties.").
256. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977), the Supreme Court articulated the test for so-called associational standing and
concluded that an association has standing when: "(a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." See also Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (discussing requirements of associational standing). Corporate
organizational standing based on shareholders' (members') racial identity is distinct from
standing arising "where 'a functional nexus exists between the purpose or activity of the
corporation and the identity of the members of that corporation,"' Gersman v. Group
Health Ass'n, 931 F.2d 1565, 1567-68 (1991), vacated, 502 U.S. 1068 (1992), and standing
where the corporation can demonstrate a concrete injury to its activities with incidental
drain on organizational resources, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379
(1982).
2006] 2075
HeinOnline -- 106 Colum. L. Rev. 2075 2006
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
deed without accepting that race is something that is knowable" 25 7 and
certainly without attributing race to legal fictions. I wish to be clear here.
I am not claiming that courts cannot attribute race to corporations, nor
am I arguing (at this moment) that they should not attribute race to cor-
porations. I maintain here only that they need not do it in order to in-
voke antidiscrimination protection for corporations. "[W]hether a cor-
poration has a racial identity is not determinative of whether that
corporation has standing to bring a discrimination claim. '258
A. Race Recognized
If there remained any uncertainty over whether federal courts have
implicitly recognized race in corporations, Judge Thomas left little room
for such speculation in Thinket. Thinket Ink Information Resources, Inc.
(Thinket), a minority-owned technology services contractor, entered into
a series of contracts with Sun Microsystems, Inc. (Sun), which required
Thinket to provide systems support services at Sun's facilities. 259 Over
time the relationship between Thinket and Sun soured, leading Thinket
to file a § 1981 claim against Sun, alleging that Sun deliberately refused
to contract with the corporation based on its status as a minority-owned
business. 260 In discussing Thinket's standing, the Ninth Circuit explicitly
found that the corporation had acquired a racial identity based on the
race of its shareholders. 2 61 The exact nature of this acquisition, however,
and how the shareholders' race bears on that of the corporation's, were
not spelled out.
Thinket relied significantly on the corporation's government certifi-
cation as a minority-owned business. As such, the court asserted,
257. Richard Thompson Ford, Racial Culture: A Critique 103 (2005) [hereinafter
Ford, Racial Critique] ("To prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, we need only
know that there is a set of ideas about race that many people accept and decide to prohibit
them from acting on the basis of these ideas.").
258. Gersman, 931 F.2d at 1568. On the other hand, the absence of consistent and
clear standing rules in corporate racial discrimination cases does subject corporate
plaintiffs to the discretion of the courts and third party petitioners, who may not have the
same incentive to challenge the alleged discriminatory conduct. "[S]hareholders, for
example, may not recover under the Civil Rights Acts for harm to the corporation they
own." Robert N. Strassfeld, Note, Corporate Standing to Allege Race Discrimination in
Civil Rights Actions, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1153, 1154 (1983). These matters ofjudicial discretion
in standing rulings, however, are not unique to corporate race-based discrimination cases.
See Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 612, 614-15 (2004) (arguing
that politics and personal preferences of judges play large role in standing decisions).
259. Thinker is certified by the Small Business Administration as a firm owned and
operated by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, and is thus eligible to
receive federal contracts under the SBA's section 8(a). Small Disadvantaged Business
Development Program, 15 U.S.C. § 637 (2000) (relevant regulations at 13 C.F.R. § 124
(2006)).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
261. Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th
Cir. 2004).
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"Thinket was required to be certified as a corporation with a racial iden-
tity." 262 This assertion is not quite correct. Government certification
merely requires fifty-one percent or more minority ownership of control
interests. Ownership and identity are obviously different, as are "racial
identity" and "minority status." Thinket could have received its minority-
owned certification with only one percent African American ownership,
so long as another fifty percent was owned by other qualifying minority
interests. What racial identity would the court assign to the corporation
in that case? 26 3 The court's conflation of minority status and racial iden-
tity may have been obscured by the fact that "all of [Thinket's] sharehold-
ers were African-American. '264 Perhaps the court relied on this fact more
than any other in concluding that the corporation possessed a racial iden-
tity. But, if so, then threshold questions remain: Was one hundred per-
cent African American ownership of Thinket necessary or sufficient, or
both, or neither?
Answers to these questions are far from obvious, but there are a
number of salient considerations that ought to enter the inquiry. First,
courts are not the sole, nor necessarily the best, authority to establish a
corporation's race. Legislators and other nonjudicial government offi-
cials, as well as private adjudicative and nonadjudicative bodies, may serve
this purpose. Promoters of the corporation may ideally define its racial
identity (recall the "efficient identities" discussion in Part II) using the
corporate charter, which might subsequently be modified by the board of
directors or the shareholders. In addition to charter-based definitions,
statutes and regulations may be used to characterize the race of the
corporation.
Furthermore, when characterizing the corporation's race, the rele-
vant decisionmaker may also look beyond the shareholders' race. There
are a number of plausible nonshareholder bases from which corporate
racial identity may be derived. The relevant decisionmaker might look to
the corporation's customers, managers, employees, or other agents, in
addition to where the business is located, the communities it serves, and
its principal activities and purposes.26 5 In Pourier v. South Dakota Depart-
262. Id. (emphasis added).
263. The court may have considered "minority status" as a form of racial identity-a
nonmajority (presumably nonwhite) racial category that privileges whiteness as unique and
lumps everything else together. There is precedent for this broadly inclusive nonwhite/
white racial categorization. Indeed the usage "colored" and "persons of color" was largely
invoked as "a generic phrase including all who were not wholly Caucasian or Indian."
Stephenson, supra note 199, at 39. Following the Civil War "[t] his nomenclature was taken
over from the antebellum statutes, and it is surprising to find how seldom the word 'Negro'
is used in the statutes and court decisions." Id.
264. Thinket, 368 F.3d at 1059.
265. For example, the court could look at those residing near the principal place of
business of the corporation or the community that the corporation principally serves (by
practice or as stated in its charter)-e.g., a business claiming to serve the "black
community" might be treated as a black business even if its owners and agents are white.
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ment of Revenue, 2 66 the Supreme Court of South Dakota concluded that
Muddy Creek Oil and Gas, Inc. possessed Sioux Indian identity based on
various policy considerations 2 67 and evidence that the corporation's "bus-
iness is operated on the reservation, the vast majority of its customers are
Indians residing on the reservation, and it is licensed by the Tribe to do
business on the reservation. '26 8
The decisionmaker might also look to the conduct of third parties in
determining a corporation's identity, as the court did in Bains LLC v. Arco
Products Co. 2 6 9 Bains differs starkly from other corporate race cases inso-
far as the court employed a notion of corporate racial identity not deter-
mined by the state, or the preferences of shareholders, or agents of the
corporation. In Bains, an East Indian owned trucking company (d/b/a
Flying B), "alleged that it had been subject to racial discrimination while
performing under the contract and that the contract had been termi-
nated in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981."270 Based on the conduct of third
parties, the Ninth Circuit found that "Flying B undoubtedly acquired an
imputed racial identity."2 71 The court considered Flying B's identity a
matter of social fact-evidenced by the defendants' behavior toward the
owners and employees of the entity. In this sense, one might say the
court merely gave legal recognition to the existence of a social fact.
Judicial recognition of race exogenously imposed onto corporations
was hypothesized two decades ago by Robert Strassfeld, noting that if peo-
ple perceive a business as having a racial identity-regardless of whether
it actually has one-then "law appropriately [should recognize] these per-
266. 2003 SD 21, 658 N.W.2d 395, vacated in part, 2004 SD 3, 674 N.W.2d 314. Loren
Pourier, a member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, owned and operated a gas station on a Sioux
reservation in South Dakota. Id. .3-4. Invoking the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent in
Oklahoma Tax Commissioner v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995), Pourier sought to
recover $940,000 in state taxes that he claimed were unjustly levied against his enterprise.
Pourier, 2003 SD 5. In response, the South Dakota Department of Revenue alleged that it
was authorized to tax Pourier's company under the Hayden-Cartwright Act, and more
importantly for our purposes, that Pourier's company failed to meet Chickasaw's threshold
requirement because as a business entity, it could not have an Indian racial identity. Id.
267. The court held that "[p]olicy considerations also weigh heavily in favor of
treating Muddy Creek as a tribal member.... [Refusal to do this] could hinder economic
development. This is particularly unwarranted in the instant case because the Pine Ridge
Reservation is the poorest in the country." Pourier, 2003 SD 25.
268. Id. 22. The court also emphasized that "Congress has recognized the fact that
there is such a thing as an 'Indian corporation.'" Id. Here too, however, the problem is
that the regulations merely require "that corporations must be at least 51% owned by
eligible Indians or Indian Tribes." Id. 24.
269. 405 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2005).
270. Bains LLC v. Arco Prods. Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
271. Bains, 405 F.3d at 770. The court noted that "the corporation is owned entirely
by Sikh shareholders, and while not all of its drivers were Sikhs, even the non-Sikh drivers
testified that they were treated poorly by Davis [ARCO's agent] based on their association
with what Davis saw as a Sikh company." Id. "Davis asked both Patrick Dauer and A.C.
Morgan, the only two Caucasian Flying B drivers, 'How did you get hooked up with these
f s?"' Id. at 767.
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ceptions, for they inevitably influence social and economic behavior."272
This approach to corporate racial attribution may be placed under the
"regarded as" conception of antidiscrimination law, recently advanced by
Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Mario Barnes.2 73 Here the emphasis is on
the realization of race, materializing-not principally through an individ-
ual's choices and actions (i.e., her performance of her racial identity)-
from the choice and actions of others (i.e., their performance of an indi-
vidual's racial identity). Thus, even though the owners of Flying B did
not themselves affirmatively attempt to attribute East Indian identity to
the business entity (nor did the government "certify" ex ante some iden-
tity in Flying B), it acquired a specific racial identity, according to the
court, based on the conduct of others.27 4
B. Rules of Recognition
There are numerous ways in which race may be legally attributed to
corporations. For instance, the Nuremberg Laws, enacted by Germany's
National Socialist (Nazi) Party, decreed that "[a] business enterprise
qualifying as ajuristic person is considered to be Jewish" if any of its "legal
representatives" are Jews, or if any "members of its supervisory boards are
Jews," or if controlling interests over the company's capital or voting
shares are held by Jews. 275 Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party were highly
suspicious of corporations, 2 76 particularly the anonymity associated with
corporate shares, which would have made it difficult for the state to deter-
272. Strassfeld, supra note 258, at 1179. "So long as bigots discriminate against
businesses managed or owned by blacks, other businesses will be less likely to hire black
managers, and other black investors will find it more difficult to pool their capital." Id.
273. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig -& Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?:
On Being "Regarded as" Black, and Why Tide VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal
Are White, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1283 (proposing framework for recognizing discrimination
claims broadly based on perceptions of discriminator rather than traits (as determined by
court) of victim of discrimination).
274. Bains, 405 F.3d at 770.
275. Legislating the Holocaust 159 (Karl A. Schleunes ed. & trans., 2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (providing translation of Nazi-era laws). Sole proprietorships
and other unincorporated businesses, including general and limited partnerships, were
also deemed Jewish (under Paragraphs 1 and 3) if any owners or partners were Jewish. Id.
Paragraph 2 motioned that "a joint-stock company or a company with limited liability" was
Jewish if any "Jews [sat] on its board of directors" or exercised "a decisive influence in its
affairs either by way of capital investment or by virtue of voting power." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Paragraph 6 imbued Jewish identity into "associations,
foundations, institutions, and other organizations which are riot business enterprises." Id.
at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. "Hitler himself expressed a pronounced animus against corporations in Mein
Kampf" Curtis Warren Bajak, The Third Reich's Corporation Law of 1937, at 62 (Dec.
1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). In an infamous 1933 speech to the Reichstag, Hitler made clear his view about the
relationship of the state (as representative of the Volk) and business (as "embodied"
through the corporation): "[T] he Volk does not exist for business.., business [serves] the
Volk." Id. at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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mine the race of businesses. 277 Anticipating this difficulty, the Reich Citi-
zenship Law sought to establish an official registry for Jewish business en-
terprises and authorized the adoption of a Jewish trademark. 278 Further
Nazi proposals to curb corporate anonymity included limiting the trans-
ferability of bearer stocks or eliminating them altogether through the
German Corporation Law of 1937.279 These proposals were ultimately
rebuffed by academic and business interests, fully aware of the tradeoff
between recognizing corporate racial identity (nonanonymity more
broadly) and the financial returns of incorporation. 28 0 That is, an im-
plicit tradeoff exists between the verifiability of race and the fluidity of
corporate interests, which, as discussed earlier, will undercut most efforts
to racialize corporations based on the race of shareholders.
The race of shareholders, of course, need not limit the race of corpo-
rations. The combinations of assignors of, and criteria for, corporate ra-
cial identity are daunting. As suggested above, corporate agents, promot-
ers, shareholders, courts, legislators, regulators, or other officials could
serve as assignors of corporate racial identity based on such criteria as
corporate customers, employees, officers, directors, shareholders, service
community, or business purposes. But to maintain some focus, I will limit
the scope of consideration to a single assignor (i.e., the court) and a sin-
gle criterion (i.e., the race of the shareholders), which I assume to be
known, observable, verifiable, and fixed. This is not an attempt to trivial-
ize the problem. I rather hope to reveal the complexities faced by courts
even under these admittedly restrictive circumstances.
By summarily denying the possibility of corporate racial identity, the
U.S. Supreme Court has not availed itself of an opportunity to consider
how the race of shareholders might bear on the racial character of corpo-
rations. However, a review of the Court's treatment of shareholders' citi-
zenship and nationality as they relate to the corporation's status is instruc-
tive. In Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, an 1809 case concerning
whether a corporation was a citizen for purposes of federal diversity juris-
diction, the Court held that corporations are not citizens in and of them-
selves.28 ' The Court addressed the diversity issue by going beyond the
corporate veil, assigning to the corporation the citizenship of its share-
holders.28 2 However, because Strawbridge v. Curtiss, decided just three
years earlier, required a complete disjoin of plaintiff and defendant citi-
277. Id.
278. That is, "a special identifying mark for those Jewish enterprises which are to be
recorded in the official directory." Legislating the Holocaust, supra note 275, at 160
(internal quotation marks omitted) (translating Nazi-era laws).
279. See Bajak, supra note 276, at 72-73.
280. Id. at 201-16. Though the Nazi proposals to curb corporate anonymity were
undermined, their larger objective of subordinating the corporation "to society and the
state" through the Corporation Law of 1937 was more successful. Id. at 204.
281. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 88 (1809).
282. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 528-29 (1839).
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zenship for diversity ("complete diversity"),283 Deveaux implied that all
shareholders of the corporation must hold the requisite characteristic of
distinct state citizenship from the adversary for it to be imputed onto the
corporation. If a single shareholder holding only one share of stock
failed to meet this test, then diversity was defeated. Such a test may be
labeled a one-share rule (an analog of the "one-drop rule" of racial deter-
mination among natural persons).284
In addition to state citizenship, the issue of corporate national
citizenship as it relates to shareholders' nationality has prompted the
intriguing question of whether a corporation can be the enemy of
a king, a state, or a nation. Clearly, legal entities (i.e., other states) can
be alien enemies. Continuing along this path, since nationals of
enemy states are generally themselves considered enemies, then a
corporation (if a national of an enemy state) can itself be an enemy of
another state. But is corporate nationality to be determined by the share-
holders' nationality? When this question arose in the context of the
Trading with the Enemy Act during World War I, the answer from the
U.S. Supreme Court was "no. '28 5 Though foreign corporations could be
enemies, a Delaware corporation wholly owned by German citizens resid-
ing in Germany, for instance, could not have been an enemy of the
United States during the first World War. 286 This position was subse-
quently reversed in the World War II case of Clark v. Uebersee Finanz
Korporation, A.G., which allowed the nationality of controlling sharehold-
ers to determine the enemy character of a corporation, 287 a position pre-
viously taken by the United Kingdom 2 88 and adopted in the Treaty of
283. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806).
284. The Court reversed this one-share diversity jurisdiction rule through Louisville,
Cincinnati & Charleston Rail-Road Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844) and
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853), employing
the irrefutable presumption that shareholders are citizens of the state of incorporation.
Today this is resolved by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1) (2000) ("[A] corporation
shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the
State where it has its principal place of business.").
285. See, e.g., Hamburg-Am. Line Terminal & Navigation Co. v. United States, 277
U.S. 138, 140-41 (1928); Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U.S. 457, 472-73 (1925).
286. Hamburg-Am., 277 U.S. at 140. Section 2 of the Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917 provided that the enemy status of a corporation was determined by the place of
incorporation and place of business. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2(a) (2000).
287. 332 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1947).
288. See the classic British case of Continental Tyre & Rubber Co., Ltd. v. Daimler
Co., Ltd., (1915) 1 K.B. 893 (A.C.), which involved a company that was incorporated in
England, but whose shares were held almost exclusively by Germans residing in Germany
during World War I (only two shares out of 25,000 outstanding were not held by
Germans). After the English Parliament passed a law prohibiting contracting with enemy
aliens, the Court of Appeal had to decide whether the entity at issue was an enemy of the
British state. The court found that the enemy alien character of the corporation's
shareholders did not deprive it of its original British citizenship. The House of Lords
subsequently reversed the Court of Appeal. Daimler Co., Ltd. v. Continental Tyre &
Rubber Co., Ltd., (1916) 2 A.C. 307, 316 (H.L.); see Hallis, supra note 6, at xlviii-xlix; see
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Versailles. 28 9 The controlling shareholder test is now commonly used to
determine the nationality of corporations-in the United States and
abroad. Such a test may be labeled a majority-share or dominant-share
rule (an analog of the predominant blood rule, once adopted by an Ohio
court, ruling that "where the white blood predominated in a person, he is
to be considered white" 290 ).
The citizenship cases reveal the difficulty of defining corporate traits
based on heterogeneous shareholders. When corporations were largely
held by local interests, all possessing the same state or national citizen-
ship, the matter of transferring shareholder citizenship to the corpora-
tion was somewhat straightforward. However, as corporate shareholders
themselves have become more diverse, identifying a unique corporate cit-
izenship (or race, ethnicity, or gender) based on shareholders has be-
come more challenging and problematic. Dual citizenship or a multira-
cial corporate identity could solve some of these problems, but will
introduce other difficulties. Perhaps a majority-share rule is the answer,
assuming that a majority of the shares are held by individuals of a particu-
lar race or ethnicity. There are numerous possible solutions, but none
likely to work across the full domain of potentially assignable shareholder
traits.
The possibilities for defining corporate racial identity based on
shareholders are as rich as, if not richer than, the ways of defining an
individual shareholder's race. Still, compared to that of natural persons,
the race of corporations is in some ways more manageable. As purely
legally constructed persons, the character of corporations "signifies what
law makes it signify. ' ' 29 1 This means that law can craft race within corpo-
rations without much of the contradiction and confusion that attend the
racial determination of natural persons. And today courts can achieve
this without many of the complications faced by the Rohleder court under
dejure segregation. Today courts can more easily assign race to corpora-
tions; whether they should is another question.
C. Risks of Recognition
Under a de jure segregation regime, the liabilities and obligations of
a racially-identified corporation would have varied substantially based on
the changing racial composition of its shareholders. 29 2 This would create
also The Queen v. Arnaud, (1846) 115 Eng. Rep. 1485 (Q.B.) (holding that British
corporation with Mexican citizen shareholders could obtain British registry for
corporation's ship).
289. See Norman Fink, That Pierced Veil-Friendly Stockholders and Enemy
Corporations, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 651, 657 (1953).
290. Stephenson, supra note 199, at 40.
291. Dewey, supra note 6, at 655.
292. "Difficulties would certainly arise if the corporation had been composed of white
men at the date of acquisition of title and later so many negroes gradually became
members that the whites lost all their influence or resigned from the corporation." Wolff,
supra note 6, at 514. Courts could fix corporate racial fluidity by constraining it to what
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significant difficulties not only for the political regime as discussed previ-
ously, but also for the corporation. Consider the likely effect on the cor-
poration's capital accumulation efforts. The corporation would find it
difficult to raise capital if its liabilities and obligations changed with the
introduction of a number of black shareholders. This is because investors
would face greater risk when purchasing the corporate issues. The mar-
ket would respond to this risk with a lower price for the securities.
Recognizing corporate racial identity underJim Crow would not only
dampen investor enthusiasm, but it would also undermine the willingness
of other parties to transact with corporations. To see this, recall first that
the law requires assets owned by a corporation to be available only to
satisfy creditors of the corporation and not creditors of the individual
shareholders. This is the key aspect of the so-called "asset partitioning"
function of the corporation. 293 When an asset is known to belong to a
corporation, a signal is sent to the world, and this information is relevant
to many kinds of persons who deal with the corporation, including poten-
tial employees, customers, lenders, suppliers, and so forth.29 4 The simple
signaling device to the world about asset partitioning would be compro-
mised if the corporation had a fluid racial identity or if the corporate
form were disregarded and the corporation treated like a collection of
(black or Jewish) individuals for purposes of enforcing, for example, a
racial covenant. Here we need not speculate that the court in People's
Pleasure Park was motivated by efficiency concerns in order to see some
efficiency in its decision to deny the existence of corporate racial identity.
Still, had the People's Pleasure Park court recognized entity racial iden-
tity, corporate investors and promoters could have committed themselves
to restrictive agreements prohibiting stock transfers to members of desig-
nated racial groups. This commitment, however, would have been diffi-
cult to maintain for the same reasons that undermined self-enforcement
of racially restrictive covenants among homeowners. 29 5 Moreover, state
courts well into the 1900s expressed considerable hostility toward restric-
existed at a particular time. Alternatively, courts could create an irrefutable presumption
of shareholders' race as a means of allowing corporate racial identity to become
immutable. See, e.g., Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 325-29
(1853) (employing irrefutable presumption that corporate shareholders are citizens of
states of incorporation).
293. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 394 (2000) (describing corporate law default rule
where "corporation's creditors have first claim on the corporation's assets"); see also
Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the 19th Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387, 391-92 (2003) (discussing
Hansmann and Kraakman's analysis of asset partitioning). On defensive asset partitioning,
which protects shareholders' personal assets from creditors of the corporation (i.e.,
shareholder limited liability), see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law 40-62 (1991).
294. I am indebted to Tom Merrill for this suggestion.
295. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Covenants and Conventions 11-14 (2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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tions on stock alienation-in large part out of fear that minority share-
holders would be taken advantage of by dominant or controlling inter-
ests. 2 9 6 Additionally, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to enforce a restrictive share agreement that was
used to restrain transfer to an African American. 297 The Court there,
296. Corporate charters and by-laws that prohibited alienation of stock were
historically held void and against public policy. "The stockholder has an entire and perfect
ownership over his own stock, and may sell and transfer it to whomsoever he pleases...."
Brightwell v. Mallory, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 196, 198 (1836); see also Victor G. Bloede Co. v.
Bloede, 34 A. 1127, 1129-30 (Md. 1896) (holding invalid corporate by-law requiring
shareholders both to provide written notice of intent to sell stock and to give right of first
refusal to other shareholders); Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co., 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 90, 99-101
(1829) (holding that corporate charter which requires transfers of stock to be done at
corporation's offices is against general laws of Commonwealth); Moore v. Bank of
Commerce, 52 Mo. 377, 379 (1873) ("The right of alienation is an incident of property,
and a by-law prohibiting this right or imposing any restrictions on its exercise would be in
restraint of trade and against public policy and therefor [sic] void."); Chouteau Spring Co.
v. Harris, 20 Mo. 382, 388 (1855) (holding that corporations may not restrain transfer of
stock or prescribe to whom transfers might be made); Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 177
N.Y.S. 873, 881 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (rejecting absolute restrictions on alienation of stocks, but
holding that corporations may require shareholders to give right of first refusal to other
shareholders when selling stock); Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 41 A. 258, 259 (R.I. 1898)
(holding that Maine law does not authorize corporate by-law requiring stockholders to
offer their shares to corporation before selling their stock). These courts worried that
minority shareholders would be subject to abuse by dominant and controlling
shareholders if restrictions were imposed on the shareholder's ability to exercise her self-
help option of alienation. The turn of the century witnessed a change in this absolute
policy, with courts enforcing restraints viewed as reasonable-such as rights of first
refusal-but still refusing to enforce more substantial restrictions, such as requiring the
consent of all shareholders or the board of directors. See Douglas v. Aurora Daily News
Co., 160 Ill. App. 506 (App. Ct. 1911) (upholding president of corporation's right of first
refusal to purchase stock); White v. Ryan, 15 Pa. C. 170 (Ct. Com. P1. 1894); Petre v. Bruce,
7 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tenn. 1928) (allowing directors option of prohibiting transfers of stock);
Herring v. Ruskin Co-Op. Ass'n, 52 S.W. 327, 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1899) (holding that by-
law prohibiting transfer of stock except to the corporation itself is void); In re Klaus, 29
N.W. 582, 585 (Wis. 1886) (holding "a by-law of a corporation which prohibits the transfer
of stock by a stockholder without the consent of all of the stockholders" void as against
public policy). The current judicial stance on restrictive stock transfer agreements is
significantly more permissive, but still informed by a policy against enforcement of
agreements that "unreasonably restrain or prohibit transferability" of the stock. Ling &
Co. v. Trinity Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1972); see also Wingfield v.
Contech Constr. Prods., Inc., 115 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding
agreement that corporation could repurchase stock at issue price rather than market price
if employee-shareholder is terminated); F.B.I. Farms, Inc. v. Moore, 798 N.E.2d 440, 447
(Ind. 2003) (upholding "restriction precluding transfer [of stock] without Board
approval"). Delaware corporate law allows stock transfer restrictions based on "designated
persons or classes of persons or groups of persons" so long as the restriction is not
manifestly unreasonable. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 202(c) (5) (2001). Since restrictions to
maintain tax advantages are presumed reasonable, identity-based restrictions (based on
"Indian" identity for instance) are supported under the statute. Id.
297. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). A Virginia corporation, Little Hunting Park, Inc., allowed
"all persons in the immediate family of the shareholder to use the corporation's
recreational facilities." Id. at 234. The shareholder could also assign his interest, subject to
2084 [Vol. 106:2023
HeinOnline -- 106 Colum. L. Rev. 2084 2006
INCORPORATING RACE
however, was significantly motivated by the effect of enforcement on the
acquisition of real property associated with the corporate stock, and it
may have ruled differently had realty not been at issue. 298
Alternatively, states, as opposed to private individuals, might have im-
posed state-based racial stock transfer restrictions. In 1836, the Louisiana
legislature made just such an imposition, the implications of which were
challenged in Boisdere & Goule v. Citizens' Bank.299 The plaintiffs ("free
persons of color") asserted "that the president and directors [of the
bank] refuse [d] to consider them as stockholders," even though they had
(three years prior) properly subscribed to, and acquired shares in, the
corporation.3 0 0 The corporate defendant admitted the assertions of
plaintiffs but, nonetheless, contended that they were required to divest
the interest of colored shareholders as a consequence of an amendatory
act by the legislature. The Act, inter alia, stipulated that "no person or
persons, who are not free white citizens . . .shall be either directly or
indirectly owners of any part of the capital stock of [the] company."'30 '
The court ruled against the bank because the amendatory Act failed to
give notice to the plaintiffs. State-imposed restrictions on share transfers
subsequently would have been contestable under the Fourteenth
Amendment, as were state restrictions on the race of corporate
employees.30 2
The likely ineffectiveness of private and state (race-based) restric-
tions on stock transfers would have made the court's determination that
corporations possess race quite impactful. If the court acknowledged cor-
porate racial identity, then corporations would have paid a hefty price
board approval. The case developed when Sullivan attempted to assign his interest to
Freeman, but "[t]he board refused to approve the assignment because Freeman was a
Negro." Id. at 235.
298. "What we have here is a device functionally comparable to a racially restrictive
covenant, the judicial enforcement of which was struck down in [Shelley]." Id. at 236. The
Court went on: "Such a sanction would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial
restrictions on [real] property." Id. at 237. Yet it seems unlikely that a restriction of this
kind, without its real property implications, would have been void prior to Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), when the Court first recognized that § 1981 and § 1982
applied to private actors.
299. 9 La. 506 (1836).
300. Id. at 509.
301. Id. at 511.
302. See, e.g., In re Parrott, 1 F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880). In Parrott the court struck
down "a provision of the California Constitution [Cal. Const. of 1879, art. XIX, § 2] that
prohibited all corporations chartered under California law from 'employ[ing], directly or
indirectly, in any capacity, any Chinese or Mongolians.'" Thomas W. Joo, New "Conspiracy
Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment: Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil Rights Cases
and the Development of Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 353, 376
(1994) (citation omitted). There have apparently been no formal attempts to separate
black-owned and white-owned businesses, though it was certainly contemplated. See, e.g.,
David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered, 114 Yale
L.J. 591, 632 (2004) (book review) (citing 1912 effort in Winston-Salem to racially
segregate businesses after city passed comparable housing segregation laws).
2006] 2085
HeinOnline -- 106 Colum. L. Rev. 2085 2006
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
(principally reflected in their costs of capital and credit) and the South's
segregationist imperative would have been significantly hindered. Thus
the refusal to allow corporations to have racial identities can be seen as
expedient (particularly in a world that enforces racial covenants and the
like) because it reduces information costs to society of understanding the
implications of corporate ownership and racial identity.
VI. A NEw POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACED PERSONS
The world, of course, is different today, which is not to suggest that
we live in a postracial society; that courts are now racializing corporations
evidences just the opposite. There remain considerable economic, politi-
cal, and social consequences in the recognition and denial of race within
corporations (as well as within natural persons). 3° 3 Legally cognizable
corporate racial identity (and for that matter corporate gender identity)
will bear on the award of contracts to minority-owned and women-owned
businesses-with billions of dollars at stake-as well as the tax treatment
of these businesses. For example, "[b]y finding that incorporation under
state law deprives a business of its Indian identity," the Pourier court ob-
served, "we would force economic developers on reservations to forgo the
benefits of incorporation in order to maintain their guaranteed protec-
tions under federal Indian law."30 4 Though the court invoked federal
Indian law to justify its "racing" of the corporation, it is precisely such
laws that make the enterprise of court-recognized corporate racial iden-
tity most dubious.
A. Individual and Community Development
While racial character has been recognized in corporations not offi-
cially designated as minority-owned, 30 5 in most cases the imprimatur of
303. Look, for instance, at the battles being waged over federal recognition of Native
American persons and tribes. With hundreds of billions of dollars in the balance, powerful
political and economic forces are being brought to bear. The allegations that notorious
lobbyist Jack Abramoff improperly accepted eighty-two million dollars from Native
American tribes, and the influx of outside financing for tribes attempting to gain
recognition are good examples of this. David Fahrenthold, Some Tribes Still Outside the
Casino Looking In, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 2005, at Al.
304. Pourier v. S.D. Dep't of Revenue, 2003 SD 21, 25, 658 N.W.2d 395, 405, vacated
in part, 2004 SD 3, 674 N.W.2d 314. For example, had the firm's activities been organized
through a partnership, rather than a corporation, the earnings of the business would flow
through to the Native American owner of the firm, who was exempted from state tax.
Thus, if the court rejected the claim that corporations could possess Native American
identity, developers might shun incorporation in favor of other organizational forms. Of
course, an imposition of corporate racial or ethnic identity is not the only means of
avoiding this organizational distortion. Through judicial interpretation or veil piercing,
for instance, the court could have achieved the same result without assigning a race or
ethnicity to the entity.
305. The courts in these cases relied substantially on the fact that the corporations
were closely held by shareholders of a single race: "This is the clearest case for a 'black'
corporation [namely,] 100% owned by blacks and a close corporation." Howard Sec.
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federal certification has featured prominently in the court's logic of cor-
porate racial attribution. For example, in Organization of Minority Vendors,
Inc., v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, the court, relying on minority-owner-
ship certification, 311 6 observed that the "language [in Arlington Heights]
does not foreclose the possibility that some corporations, like the plain-
tiffs, which have been identified as minority business enterprises under
federal regulations, do have a 'racial identity. "307 The Thinket court, like
the Pourier court, also hinged its attribution of corporate racial identity
on federal certification of control-ownership by minorities. 30 8  The
relevant certification in Pourier was based on the Indian Business
Development Program (IBDP),309 and related regulations issued by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA),310 while Thinket Inc. was certified under
the Small Business Administration's (SBA) procedures for designating
minority-owned enterprises. 31 1 The IBDP and SBA programs have similar
requirements of at least fifty-one percent ownership of, and active man-
agement participation in, the corporation by specified individuals. 31 2 But
there is one important difference between these programs: SBA certifica-
tion imposes no community restrictions, while the IBDP is limited to en-
terprises that serve the tribal community.31 3
Servs. Inc. v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 516 F. Supp. 508, 513 n.1l (D. Md. 1981); see also
T & S Serv. Assoc. Inc. v. Crenson, 505 F. Supp. 938, 943 (D.R.I. 1981). The record in
Crenson does not reveal that the corporation was certified as a minority business enterprise,
and the opinion does not give weight to such consideration. Similarly, the court in Rosales
v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1489, 1494-97 (D. Colo. 1988),
emphasized the possibility that corporations could possess a "minority racial identity"
without relying on federal certification-though ultimately not deciding on whether the
corporation in question had a racial identity. In the case of sole ownership, courts seem
particularly inclined to use an alter ego approach. For example, in Howard the court held
that "Howard [Security Services Inc.] is a close corporation, apparently wholly owned by
Blanheim and operated by him as owner. To deal with Howard is, practically speaking, to
deal with Blanheim." 516 F. Supp. at 513.
306. 579 F. Supp. 574, 588 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("The individual corporate plaintiffs
qualified as minority business enterprises under Department of Transportation
regulations, 49 CFR § 265.5(j).").
307. Id. at 588 (emphasis added).
308. See Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053,
1059-60 (9th Cir. 2004); Pourier, 2003 SD 24.
309. 25 U.S.C. § 1521 (2000).
310. 25 C.F.R. § 286 (2006).
311. 13 C.F.R. § 124 (2006).
312. 13 C.F.R. § 124.105 (explaining that to be eligible for SBA program, corporation
must be "unconditionally and directly owned by one or more socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals" (emphasis added)); 25 C.F.R. § 286.3 ("[Eligible entities] shall
be at least fifty-one percent owned by eligible Indians or an eligible Indian tribe. This Indian
ownership must actively participate in the management and operation of the economic
enterprise by representation on the board of directors of a corporation .... " (emphasis
added)).
313. 25 C.F.R. § 286.7 ("To be eligible for a grant an economic enterprise must be
located on an Indian reservation or located where it makes or will make an economic
contribution to a nearby reservation .... ).
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By tethering Indian corporations to reservations, the federal Indian
business assistance program restricts corporate growth in potentially
profound ways given the limited resources on many reservations. To be
sure, supporting infrastructure and development on Native American res-
ervations is an appropriate undertaking for the federal government. But
if the ultimate aim of the business assistance program is to develop Native
American communities, then why restrict the inducements to only
Indian-owned businesses? Certainly, these communities could benefit
from more competition. Imagine the number of businesses that would
serve reservations if they too could avoid state taxes. 314 On the other
hand, if the assistance program is intended to promote Indian-owned
businesses, then why constrain these businesses to communities with lim-
ited ability to support their growth? The problem, plainly, is that the
program seeks to serve two distinct ends with a single tool-a strategy that
invites failure on both counts.
Still more disconcerting is that the IBDP sends the clear message
that the proper place for Indian businesses is on the reservation. There is
much to be concerned about here, where federal agencies endorse dis-
tinctive choices and actions as appropriate to particular persons, legal or
natural. This concern is compounded when courts enter the fray, defin-
ing which indicia of behaviors and choices (e.g., seeking federal certifica-
tion) make a corporate person, for instance, legally black or Indian. This
practice was suspect in the racial determination cases of natural persons
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is not less so today in
the cases involving legal persons.
B. The Identity Commons
Moreover, it is not clear that the courts' current practice fulfills any
necessary legal purposes. Literal possession of a specified racial identity
is not essential for standing in race-based discrimination suits, and the
benefits accruing to minority-owned businesses flow from the owners' ra-
cial identity, not the businesses'. 3 15 What, therefore, is gained by the
314. The Court chipped away at this possibility in Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157 (1980), where it recognized that states
may tax nonmembers even when their efforts are significantly connected to the tribes'
economic and political interests.
315. There is, of course, a potential for abuse and fraud here, as suggested by the
court in Organization of Minority Vendors, Inc. v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 579 F.
Supp. 574, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (pointing to pervasive practice of "white male owners
transferring stock to their wives," a practice that had become so widespread that "'women-
owned firms account for the vast majority of MBE procurement' by the defendant
railroads" (citation omitted)). But this potential exists whether corporations are deemed
to possess race or not. The strongest case for the necessity of recognizing corporate racial
identity has been made in disputes involving whether a corporate entity may claim state tax
immunity based on Indian identity. This was the issue raised in Pourier v. South Dakota
Department of Revenue, 2003 SD 21, 4, 658 N.W.2d 395, 397-98, vacated in part, 2004
SD 3, 674 N.W.2d 314, and Baraga Products Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 971 F. Supp.
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courts' policing of corporate racial identity? The question does not go to
the more abstract issue of whether corporate persons do or should have
racial identities. My concern here is much narrower.3 16 What, if any-
thing, would be lost if corporations adopted any racial identity they
wished? A skeptic of this suggestion might insist that unrestrained adop-
tion of a race by legal persons-who bear no necessary resemblance or
connection to their nominal natural person counterparts-would de-
value the identity, particularly for those natural persons who suffer real
costs associated with that identity. Bearing none of these costs while ap-
propriating benefits, one might argue that corporations should be ex-
pected to engage in racial adoption to an extent and manner commensu-
rate with their extraordinary capacity to commodify. They would, in
simple economic terms, engage in overproduction and generate negative
externalities-identity externalities-if allowed to adopt race without re-
straint.317 Therefore, the skeptic might conclude, the state should pro-
tect the "identity commons" from overuse and misuse.318
294, 294-95 (W.D. Mich. 1997). Though these two cases come out oppositely on the issue,
they both implicitly agree that the corporation itself must be deemed an "enrolled tribal
member" of a federally recognized tribe to avoid being taxed by the state. Baraga, 971 F.
Supp. at 296-97; Pourier, 2003 SD 21-28. Disregarding the corporate veil or
recognizing the corporate entity as the alter ego of the single shareholder (as in Howard
Security Services, Inc. v.Johns Hopkins Hospital, 516 F. Supp. 508, 513 (D. Md. 1981)), is
rejected. The Baraga court in particular was hostile to the notion of a selective disregard:
"[P]laintiff is asking the Court to recognize it as a corporation for all purposes except
taxation. Yet plaintiff can not have its cake and eat it too." 971 F. Supp. at 298.
Revealingly, the Baraga court seemed trapped by its strict concession view of corporations.
Id. at 296-98 ("[The] plaintiff cannot plausibly turn around and ask this Court to declare
it immune from taxes levied by the very state which created it.... [T]he corporation is a
creature of state law, created and existing only by virtue of state law."). Neither court was
willing to interpret the tax code in order to grant immunity to Indian-owned corporations.
If veil piercing and interpretation of the tax code remain off the table (and it is not
obvious why they should) going forward, such conflicts can be avoided through a
regulatory or legislative adjustment by relevant tax authorities or by Indian businesses
choosing alternative organizational forms-such as limited liability companies (LLCs)-
that offer many of the benefits of incorporation while allowing for flow-through tax
treatment. These alternatives to "racing" Indian-owned businesses for tax purposes are not
without costs, but as I will discuss subsequently, they may be less costly than the implied
rule in Pourier and Baraga.
316. See Ford, Racial Critique, supra note 257, at 16 ("[O]ne should be worried about
a rights regime that would give judges sweeping authority to determine and enforce ideas
of 'correct' or authentic group culture.").
317. Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 15, at 717 ("A dress is a symbol of femininity. If a
man wears a dress, this may threaten the identity of other men. There is an externality,
and further externalities result if these men make some response.").
318. The skeptic might also claim that the state has a right to craft race in corporate
persons, in a manner it does not in natural persons, because corporations owe their very
existence to the state. Indeed, as suggested earlier, it was this very view that empowered
the Baraga court to define the boundaries of race in business forms-recognizing, for
instance, that a sole proprietorship may have racial character for tax purposes, but a single-
shareholder-owned corporation cannot because the state did not privilege corporate
entities with such character. See Baraga, 971 F. Supp. at 297.
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The problem with this conclusion, however, is that it presupposes a
false sense of command and competence in the state's ability to regulate
identity. The state cannot command the performance of race by others,
whose motivations, prejudices, and preferences are often beyond their
own conscious self-regulation, much less being subject to the govern-
ment's clumsy tools of control. If one proclaims herself (or her corpora-
tion) black and others treat her (or her corporation) as black-whatever
that means-then her black (corporate) identity is significantly per-
formed, with the possible exception of the role reserved for the state. But
the state alone cannot deny her black identity, no more than it alone can
affirm it.
Beyond the state's limited command, there is also ample reason to
question its competence in identifying and restricting racial identity. The
Indian Arts and Crafts Act (JACA), for instance, restricts use of the brand
"Indian" (with threat of imprisonment and fines) to federally certified
"Indians" only.3 19 Thus, as Richard Ford points out, the IACA "reifies a
Native-American identity that was imposed by the federal government, in
many cases over the fierce objection of Native-Americans." 320 Worse yet,
for those Native American artists lacking proper federal certification, the
IACA questions not just the authenticity of their work, but the authentic-
ity of their identity as Indian artists.3 2' The state cannot manage the
identity commons, nor should it attempt to do so.
C. Production and Recognition
Yetjust because the state can neither fully control nor perfectly iden-
tify "race" does not mean it must ignore race-pretending, for instance,
to be colorblind-in the face of racial injustice. 32 2 The state's duty to
respond to injustice is compelled by law and morality, and fulfilling this
319. Indian Arts and Crafts Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 305-305f (2000).
320. Ford, Racial Critique, supra note 257, at 89.
321. In some cases, individuals chose not to obtain federal certification because "[i]n
their minds, their identity as Native-Americans arguably depends on their independence
from formally recognized tribes." Id. In many other cases, the choice was made by others.
Ford recounts the story of Bert Seabourn, an artist of Cherokee descent: "'His work hangs
in the Vatican. Like many Cherokees in eastern Oklahoma... his forebears didn't register
with the Dawes Commission at the turn of the century .... Now Mr. Seabourn can't call
himself an Indian artist because his ancestors aren't on the list."' Id. at 89-90 (quoting
Editorial, Rubber Tomahawks, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1992, at A14).
322. Class-based affirmative action, for instance, is often proposed as one means
through which the state may correct for racial disparities in higher education while not
being explicitly cognizant of race. The implication of this proposition is that class is a
sufficient proxy for race. However, the correspondence between class and race is not quite
as strong as suggested by class-based affirmative action proponents, which implies likely
inefficiencies (with resultant delays) associated with this means of correcting racial
disparities. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Efficient Affirmative Action (Yale Law Sch., SELA
Working Paper, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Roland G. Fryer, Jr., Glenn
C. Loury & Tolga Yuret, Color-Blind Affirmative Action (2003) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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duty will often oblige the state to recognize race, if only to grasp the na-
ture of the underlying harm or injustice which is to be addressed. But
the line between recognizing race and producing race is hard to draw
and impossible to see. For many this is a significant concern. When well-
intentioned courts resolve legal questions by recognizing race in corpora-
tions, they run the risk of producing race (with all its intended and unin-
tended effects). While I am sympathetic to this concern, I do not feel
that production of race is the real problem here. The problem is an un-
derstanding of race as based on the presence of some identifiable essence
or characteristic existing in persons. The senseless search for racial es-
sence is the real concern, as I see it, and racial production is merely an
unfortunate consequence.
I have few serious qualms with racial or cultural production per se.
Individuals should be able to produce and consume whatever they desire
within the bounds of law and within the bounds established by respect of
others. I take this proposition to be generally true, whether the produc-
tion or consumption involves candy, rice, culture, or race. Though, ad-
mittedly, it is sometimes unpleasant to watch someone ungraciously gob-
bling up candy and rice, or culture and race, yet these are the goods we
produce and consume. Indeed, if we extend the analogy of a market for
race, then some of my concerns may be expressed in terms of excessive
state production and overly intrusive state regulation of the market. The
state exhibits limited competence and exerts undue influence when it
participates too actively in racial production. Private actors instead
should produce race and do so with minimal governmental intervention.
On occasion, the state may be called upon to intervene, as it sometimes
must even in well-functioning markets. Participants in such markets rou-
tinely call on courts to recognize, for instance, the existence of contracts;
and just as courts exercise care not to impute or create the terms of an
agreement when recognizing the existence of a contract, so too should
courts be hesitant to impute or produce racial character when recogniz-
ing the existence of race or race-based phenomena.
But can there be court recognition of race without court production
of race? Of course not; to see this consider again the contract analogy.
In recognizing contracts the court is constructing the kinds of promises
and agreements that are legally enforceable. Parties to a contract cannot
write any old agreement they wish. Often it would simply be a written
document without any legal force. For it to be a contract, the court must
recognize it as such, and through that recognition the court is character-
izing the broad determinants of contract (e.g., the presence of an offer,
an acceptance, and consideration, or foreseeable detrimental reliance
and such). In this sense, there cannot be judicial recognition without
some construction. Importantly, the substantial force behind this con-
struction by the court is largely due to the fact that contracts, like corpo-
rations, are legal constructs. A legally enforceable exchange of promises
(a contract) is what the law says it is.
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The court constructs what it means for agreements to be legally en-
forceable, which is to say that the court creates the categories into which
promises may be organized as legally enforceable and not. But the court
is not creating the terms of those agreements. The parties are. In mak-
ing their promises and conforming to the parameters laid out by the
court, the parties choose the terms of exchange. The court does not de-
termine what, when, where, and how the exchanges should be made and
by whom. The character of the contract is left to the parties to design.
Similarly, the court may recognize race in persons (natural and legal)
without defining the attributes that determine any person's race. In rec-
ognizing the phenomena of race the courts are in a very real sense en-
gaged in constructing race broadly, but this does not imply that the court
is determining the specific character of race in persons. Such thick con-
struction of racial identity ought to be the domain of private individuals.
Legal judgments about race should recognize race as minimally as
possible. Courts should avoid recognizing race when they can address
unjust distributions of gains and penalties without imposing their own
racial classification on persons (or interactions). To do otherwise risks
constraining individual autonomy. The courts' recognition of the pres-
ence or absence of race in corporations should be avoided when legal
questions can be resolved through conventional means. This claim ap-
plies to both Thinket's acknowledgement of corporate racial identity and
to People's Pleasure Park's denial of corporate racial identity. In both cases,
the courts had numerous alternatives to achieve the realized outcomes
without defining the broader contours of race. Perhaps these courts had
an interest in defining the contours of race, but that is not their business.
The work of defining racial identity-the work of defining identity-is
better left to private individual actors.
D. Production and Identification
If there is good reason to be concerned about excessive state produc-
tion of race, might there not also be reason to worry about racial produc-
tion by private corporations, which like the state wield tremendous influ-
ence over our society? Is there not a real risk that corporate racial
identity, like corporate social responsibility, "will become just another
commodity that businesses sell in the service of short-term shareholder
wealth maximization? '323 Perhaps, but at the same time it is worth em-
phasizing that the marketing of social objects is not the same as identify-
ing with those objects. This distinction can be seen in the market for
multicultural objects.
323. Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social
Movements, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1227, 1239 (2002) (expressing "real concern that corporate
social responsibility will become just another commodity ... rather than the basis for any
substantive change in the way business is done" (citation omitted)).
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David Rieff has observed in this market an unanticipated concor-
dance of interests between promoters of capitalism and multiculturalism.
"[B]oth groups see the same racial and gender transformations in the
demographic makeup of the United States," and hence "business leaders
have become multiculturalists out of these perceived necessities."3 2 4
True enough, but it would be a mistake to equate the liberal capitalist's
commitment to multiculturalism with the commitments held by those for
whom multiculturalism is part of their social identity. 325 By this, I do not
mean to suggest that one set of commitments is more or less instrumental
than the other. The point is simply that producing and marketing cul-
tural objects is different from identifying with those objects.
It is obvious, furthermore, that the commitments derived from cul-
tural or racial identification are distinct from commitments to business
plan and profit-seeking goals that motivate the marketing of culture and
race. Indeed, what seems to bother people most about corporate cultural
production is that corporations generally display no real commitment to
the peoples and practices of the cultures they exploit. But, if desired, a
corporation could manifest a genuine commitment by adopting a partic-
ular identity, which connects it to people and practices commonly associ-
ated with that identity. The claim here is not that corporate cultural pro-
duction is unproblematic or that corporate racial identity offers a
complete or even partial solution. It is rather simply a claim that the two
are different.3 26
CONCLUSION
Judge Friendly once observed that questions about whether corpora-
tions do, can, or ought to possess race-or, for that matter, ethnicity,
gender, religion, and so on-were "only [of] academic importance." 327
This certainly appeared to be the case at the time he made this observa-
tion. For even when it looked like courts were anthropomorphizing cor-
porations, the common law tradition actually resisted assigning social
identities to these entities. Relevant cases generally arose when some
contractual clause or legal rule implicated characteristics normally resid-
ing in natural persons, but not in corporations, or at least not in the
corporation in the case at hand. 328 Courts typically resolved these cases
324. David Rieff, Multiculturalism's Silent Partner, Harper's Mag., Aug. 1993, at 67,
70.
325. See id. ("Obviously, business leaders ... are hardly motivated by the altruism or
righteous anger that informs the views of the academic multiculturalists. But this does not
make their commitment to multiculturalism any less complete.").
326. They may, of course, overlap, as when corporations adopt racial identity as a
marketing ploy.
327. Hudson Valley Freedom Theater, Inc. v. Heimbach, 671 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir.
1982).
328. For example, legal documents reference qualities which only human beings are
normally thought to have: "religion, race, nobility, [or] the quality of being the King's
enemy, etc." Wolff, supra note 6, at 513.
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by interpreting the clause or legal rule so as to produce the same out-
come that would result if the corporation possessed the germane charac-
teristic. But this is not an assignment of race to the corporation. It is
pragmatic interpretation. If interpretation failed, courts might "glimpse"
behind the corporate curtain and use the shareholders as a proxy for the
corporate entity. This, too, is not an assignment-it is a disregard of the
legal form (i.e., veil piercing). In the past, courts have pursued equitable
outcomes without attributing race to corporations. There is currently a
movement away from these prior practices and toward a more liberal rec-
ognition of race with respect to corporate persons. Whether this move-
ment will turn out to be more than an academic curiosity is still to be
seen. But, at the moment, it is worth observing the revealed legal treat-
ment of race and persons at the turn of our new century.
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